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Abstract: Effective governance of oil resources has been identified as the thread that divides
countries such as Norway and Nigeria. That means, to convert oil resources into
sustainable development, good governance is necessary. In order to discuss the
governance of the petroleum resources within a broader context, Ghana’s performance
on three global governance indexes was assessed. Namely, the Mo Ibrahim
Governance Index, Corruption Index, published by the Transparency International and
the Resource Governance Index, published by the Natural Resource Governance
Institute. Out of the many governance indicators available, the emphasis is given to
indicators that relate much to oil and gas governance. On this basis, the Resource
Governance Index, Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the Corruption
Perception Index were selected. These indicators are themselves a host of other
independently constructed indices developed by other entities. For these governance
indicators, scores and trends are analyzed to identify subtle governance issues.
Attention is also given to major components of the index and their subcategories,
especially those that are relevant to the oil and gas governance. The findings indicate
that governance performance in the petroleum sector has been mixed.
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Dear Editor, 
 
We wish to thank the reviewers for their comments 
Comments Response 
1. The Abstract: The abstract could have 
been more informative about the central 
argument of the paper instead of simply 
saying: ''The findings indicate that 
governance performance in the petroleum 
sector has been mixed''.  
 
The abstract has been re-written to reflect the 
purpose of the paper. 
 
Effective governance of oil and gas resources has 
been identified as the thread that divides countries 
such as Norway and Nigeria when it comes to 
converting their petroleum resources to drive 
sustainable inclusive growth and development. 
This study assesses the governance framework that 
was in place before the oil and gas find in Ghana 
and those that have been put in place post-oil and 
gas. We then explore the performance of Ghana on 
key global governance indicators before and after 
the oil find, namely the Mo Ibrahim Governance 
Index, Corruption Index and the Resource 
Governance Index. The following reasons motivate 
the focus on Ghana in this study: firstly, the IMF 
predicts that Ghana will be one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world in 2019 mainly 
due to the coming on stream of new oil and gas 
fields.  Secondly, the country is relatively 
politically stable compared to other countries in 
the region. The findings indicate that emphasis is 
placed on the enactment of laws and policies and 
to some extent, evidence that these laws are 
implemented. The reality is that, the passage of 
laws does not guarantee good governance. Often, 
the missing link is how the laws are implemented. 
Since some of these laws have discretionary 
provisions, these indices need to consider how the 
laws are implemented and their potential impact on 
the governed 
2. The ''Good governance'' argument: The 
concept of ‘’good governance’’ remains a 
black box in the extractive 
sector/corruption debate. I suggest the 
authors do a thorough discussion of the 
concept of ''good governance'' because of 
the failure or inadequacy of the Resource 
Curse Thesis to explain fully the causes of 
the under-performance of natural resource-
rich economies in Africa. Again, it is worth 
We have introduced section on ‘Good 
Governance and its indicators. We have also 
discussed Ghana’s performance on the World 
Governance Indicators, and a sub-section on EITI. 
We have compared Ghana’s performance under 
the Governance Index to the global set (89 
countries). 
Response to Reviewers
noting that, corruption is also a form of 
‘governance' in itself and thus not a 
consequence of aberrations from 'good 
governance'. Furthermore, positive 
outcomes of the oil/gas sector cannot be 
solely reduced to 'so-called good 
governance' indicators – e.g. transparency 
and accountability – because many 
countries that have performed poorly are 
paradoxically signatories to the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
Despite these, the authors seem to suggest 
that ''good governance'' (e.g. enactment of 
laws) automatically casts out 'demons' in 
the oil and gas sector, and guarantee better 
economic outcomes without indicating 
usual clandestine deals, vested interests 
and corruption syndicates which are an 
integral part of the governance process. 
The quote below is illustrative of this 
observation:  
 
The theoretical anchor of the paper is 
missing. How do you foreground theoretical 
contributions of the paper? The authors 
should consider raising theoretically 
refreshing questions 
We have introduced a section 3 on Good 
Governance. We have attempted to provide a 
theoretical framework for this study. 
Methodology: the authors should justify 
convincingly why they chose to use the three 
global governance indicators and the 
limitations for the validity of the conclusions 
reached in the paper. 
 
We have provided justification- these rankings are 
relevant to both governance and the petroleum 
sector. We have added the World Governance 
Indicators 
3. Poor conclusion: why did the author use 
the metaphors ''Siamese twins'' and 
''Awkward Couple'' in the title? These 
metaphors give readers the impression that 
an attempt will be made to establish a 
certain connection/disconnect between 
good governance and the performance of 
oil & gas sectors but they missed the 
The conclusion has been re written 
 
The Petroleum Revenue Management Law has 
embedded in its good governance provisions on 
accountability and transparency. One of the 
unique features of the law is the active 
participation of an oversight body made up of 
nominated members of diverse non-governmental 
groups known as the Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee (PIAC). The law also 
opportunity to address a key message of 
the paper. What sets of factors or 
conditions are decisive of the outcomes of 
Ghana's oil and gas sector? No attempt was 
made to address this but instead, I read a 
recap or a repetition of issues already 
highlighted in the preceding sections of the 
manuscript. I think the conclusion section 
offers authors the opportunity to pull 
together the threads or connect different 
dots and give a series of messages that 
address central questions posed by the 
authors in the introduction section.   
 
mandates other institutions such as the Ministry of 
Finance and the Bank of Ghana to provide a 
detailed report within a specified period. Quite 
frankly, a lot of information has been made 
available on the receipts and utilisation of 
petroleum revenues. However, the implementation 
of the law over the past seven (7) have proven that 
the law is not without defects.  Key among the 
limitations are timeliness of information, 
discrepancies in information made available to 
the public by various agencies, lack of detailed 
information on ABFA funded projects and 
spending choices by the national oil company. 
To discuss the governance of the petroleum 
resources within a broader context, Ghana’s 
performance on three global governance indexes 
was assessed. Namely, the Mo Ibrahim 
Governance Index, Corruption Index, published 
by the Transparency International and the 
Resource Governance Index, published by the 
Natural Resource Governance Institute. Out of the 
many governance indicators available, the 
emphasis is given to indicators that relate much to 
oil and gas governance.  
On this basis, the Resource Governance Index, the 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the 
Corruption Perception Index were selected. These 
indicators are themselves a host of other 
independently constructed indices developed by 
other entities. For these governance indicators, 
scores and trends are analysed to identify subtle 
governance issues. Attention is also given to 
major components of the index and their 
subcategories, especially those that are relevant 
to the oil and gas governance. 
According to the findings, Ghana’s performance 
on the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index 
deteriorated between 2012 and 2015 mainly due 
to transparency and accountability issues. The 
index started to improve from 2016, but 
transparency and accountability continued to 
decline. Transparency and Accountability are the 
weakest among these poor performing sub-
categories of indicators under the four 
governance dimensions measured by IIAG.   
Transparency and Accountability is, therefore, a 
major factor behind the deteriorating governance 
in Ghana. Transparency was better in periods 
leading up to oil production (2008-2011) 
compared to the era of significant oil production, 
which has seen transparency and accountability 
decline consistently. The year 2010, which 
marked the commencement of oil production in 
Ghana, recorded the highest CPI score ever 
under this old scale with a score of 4.1. However, 
this could not be sustained in the following year 
as the score fell to 3.9 in 2011. Under the old 
scale, the lowest score (3.3) was recorded in 2003 
and 2006. 
According to the Resource Governance Index, oil 
and gas governance in Ghana is the best resource 
governance in Sub Saharan Africa. However, 
when compared with global leaders like Norway, 
Ghana has a long way to go. But for revenue 
management, the main component of the 
governance index performed consistently well, 
with value realization (licensing, taxation, state 
enterprises, and environmental protection) and 
enabling environment (concerning issues of 
accountability, rule of law, stability, corruption, 
regulatory, among others.) scoring 61 and 70 
respectively. The governance of revenue 
management performed poorly with a score of 37 
out of 100.  Again, there issues with the 
inadequate information on the reasons for 
capping the stabilization fund at a specified level. 
Are good governance and the petroleum sector 
awkward couple or Siamese twins? Evidence 
suggests that good governance practices are 
required to promote sustainable petroleum 
resource management. This implies that 
institutions need to be established, human capital 
developed, laws and regulations passed whilst 
transparency and accountability measures put in 
place. However, the presence of these systems and 
initiatives only partially guarantee good 
governance. The implementation, review and 
continual improvement in governance systems 
promote effective governance of the petroleum 
sector. In Ghana’s case, laws and regulations 
have been passed, regulatory and other relevant 
institutions have been established, scholarships 
have been awarded to build capacity while the 
Public Interest and Accountability Committee has 
been established to promote good governance. 
These notwithstanding, implementation of these 
laws have not been smooth. The inclusion of 
discretionary provisions, the absence of 
guidelines to exercise these discretionary 
provisions and parliament’s unwillingness to act 
on PIAC’s recommendations mean there is a 
general improvement in transparency but limited 
accountability. 
In a nutshell, three key observations are made. 
First, the passage of laws and evidence of 
implementation, which are often measured by 
these indices measure, may not suitably tell the 
story of good governance. For instance, whilst a 
score will be awarded for the establishment of a 
regulator like the Petroleum Commission, effort 
should be made to analyse the extent to which the 
Commission has performed its core mandate. 
Therefore, how the laws are implemented should 
be of much interest. Second, the exercise of 
discretionary power by Ministers should be of 
much concern. Finally, the indices should also 
have a bottom-up assessment to ensure balance. 
For instance, how the implementation of laws and 
policies are affecting the livelihood of the 
individuals and entities who are governed. 
The study recommends that the government 
should implement holistically and immediately the 
governance provisions in the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Law. Also, though certain types of 
public disclosures may not be required by law, 
publishing such information can enhance public 
confidence in the petroleum governance system. 
  
 The paper has been substantially rewritten to 
correct other issues. 
 
Abstract 
Effective governance of oil and gas resources has been identified as the thread that divides 
altruistic and self-aggrandising behaviour when it comes to converting their petroleum resources 
to drive sustainable inclusive growth and development. This study assesses the governance 
framework that was in place before the oil and gas find in Ghana and those that have been put in 
place post-oil and gas. We then explore the performance of Ghana on key global governance 
indicators before and after the oil find, namely the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, Corruption 
Index and the Resource Governance Index. The following reasons motivate the focus on Ghana in 
this study: firstly, the IMF predicts that Ghana will be one of the fastest-growing economies in the 
world in 2019 and beyond, mainly due to the coming on stream of new oil and gas fields.  Secondly, 
the country is relatively politically stable compared to other countries in the region. The findings 
indicate that emphasis is placed on the enactment of laws and policies and to some extent, evidence 
that these laws are implemented. The passage of laws does not guarantee good governance. Often, 
the missing link is how the laws are implemented. Since some of these laws have discretionary 
provisions, there are chances that indivual and institutional actors can exhibit altruistic behaviour 
otherwise. Global governance  indices therefore need to consider how these laws are implemented 
and their potential impact on the governed. 
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Effective governance of oil and gas resources has been identified as the thread that divides 
altruistic and self-aggrandising behaviour when it comes to converting their petroleum 
resources to drive sustainable inclusive growth and developmentEffective governance of oil 
and gas resources has been identified as the thread that divides countries such as Norway 
and Nigeria when it comes to converting their petroleum resources to drive sustainable 
inclusive growth and development. This study assesses the governance framework that was 
in place before the oil and gas find in Ghana and those that have been put in place post-oil 
and gas. We then explore the performance of Ghana on key global governance indicators 
before and after the oil find, namely the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, Corruption Index and 
the Resource Governance Index. The following reasons motivate the focus on Ghana in this 
study: firstly, the IMF predicts that Ghana will be one of the fastest-growing economies in the 
world in 2019 and beyond, mainly due to the coming on stream of new oil and gas fields.  
Secondly, the country is relatively politically stable compared to other countries in the region. 
The findings indicate that emphasis is placed on the enactment of laws and policies and to 
some extent, evidence that these laws are implemented. The passage of laws does not 
guarantee good governance. Often, the missing link is how the laws are implemented. Since 
some of these laws have discretionary provisions, there are chances that indivual and 
institutional actors can exhibit altruistic behaviour otherwise. Global governance  indices 
therefore need to consider how these laws are implemented and their potential impact on the 
governed. 
This study assesses the governance framework that was in place before the oil and gas find 
in Ghana and those that have been put in place post-oil and gas. We then explore the 
performance of Ghana on key global governance indicators before and after the oil find, 
namely the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, Corruption Index and the Resource Governance 
Index. The following reasons motivate the focus on Ghana in this study: firstly, the IMF predicts 
that Ghana will be one of the fastest-growing economies in the world in 2019 mainly due to 
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the coming on stream of new oil and gas fields.  Secondly, the country is relatively politically 
stable compared to other countries in the region. The findings indicate that emphasis is placed 
on the enactment of laws and policies and to some extent, evidence that these laws are 
implemented. The reality is that, the passage of laws does not guarantee good governance. 
Often, the missing link is how the laws are implemented. Since some of these laws have 
discretionary provisions, these indices need to consider how the laws are implemented and 
their potential impact on the governed. 
























Countries that produce natural resources tend to experience lower growth and worse 
development outcomes compared to countries that do not – the so-called “natural resource 
curse” (Auty, 1993)[1].1 This phenomenon has been partially attributed to the absence of good 
governance (Mavrotas et al., 2011[2]; Graham et al., 2016 [3]). Good governance has been 
considered as a significant factor that can reverse the resource curse, thereby translating oil 
rents into sustainable development (Mehlum et al., 2006 [4]; Robinson et al. 2006[5]; Mavrotas 
et al., 2011[2]; Torvik, 2009 [6];  Amiri et al., 2019 [7]; Tsani, 2013 [8], Graham et al. 2016 [3]). 
For example,  Mehlum et al., (2006) [4] found that the differences in quality of institutions are 
the main reason why natural resources tend to be beneficial to some countries. Likewise, 
                                                          




































































Robinson et al. (2006) [5] showed that a resource boom would raise national incomes in the 
presence of robust institutions while it distorts the economy further in the presence of weak 
institutions.  
Oil and gas rents can constitute a significant budgetary instrument whose proper use is 
strongly dependent on government transparency and accountability. This money can foster 
long-term socio-economic development, but it can also be misused, for example, to extend 
the political and economic power of the ruling elite (Kowalezyk-Hoyer, 2011) [9]. 
In 2007, Ghana found crude oil in commercial quantities.  Since then, there have been several 
discoveries2 which are at various stages of development and production. The oil find was 
expected to have a positive effect on the economy and provide the necessary resources 
needed to pursue a sustainable development agenda ((Arthur, 2012 [10], Obeng-Odoom, 
2014 [11], Siakwah, 2018 [12]). Cautioned by the possibility of the new oil find being a curse 
instead of a blessing, Ghana put in place various measures aimed at improving governance 
in the petroleum sector and the broader economy such as the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act (PRMA). However, the critical policy-relevant questions remain: (1) has 
governance improved or deteriorated in Ghana since the onset of oil and gas production?; and 
(2) are there positive spillover effects from the improved governance in the petroleum sector 
to the broader economy?  
This study assesses the governance framework that was in place before the oil and gas find 
and those that have been put in place post-oil and gas. We then explore the performance of 
Ghana on key global governance indicators before and after the oil find. The following reasons 
motivate the focus on Ghana in this study; firstly, the IMF predicts that Ghana will be one of 
the fastest-growing economies in the world in 2019 mainly due to the coming on stream of 
new oil and gas fields.  Secondly, the country is considered to be relatively politically stable 
compared to other countries in the region. The country has undergone seven (7) successive 
elections from 1992 to 2016 which resulted in a peaceful transition of power between the two 
(2) main political parties. This has made the country one of the preferred investment 
destinations in Africa3. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 looks at the contribution of petroleum 
revenues to Ghana’s economy from 2011 to 2017.  In Section 3,  we discuss governance in 
the petroleum sector while Section 4 discusses the methodology used in this paper and key 
findings. In Section 5, we discuss the findings in the context of Ghana’s petroleum sector while 
the conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2 Oil and Gas and the Ghanaian Economy  
A total amount of 3,993.7 million USD was accrued from the exploitation of petroleum from 
2011 to 2017, as shown in Figure 1. The inflow of petroleum revenues have experienced a 
                                                          
2 See https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/west-africa/ghana/ten-field and 
https://www.eni.com/en_IT/operations/upstream/exploration-model/octp-ghana.page 






































































steady increase from 2011 to 2014  but started to decline in 2015. As expected, the pattern of 
receipts tends to mimic the movement in oil prices. 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from various PIAC Reports4 
**Where the line is average Brent crude oil price 
 
On average, petroleum revenues contributed 4.2% and 0.9% to domestic revenues and GDP, 
respectively.5 The highest contribution was in 2014. Not surprisingly, this is the year that the 
receipt of petroleum revenues was highest over the period under consideration. In terms of 
export, crude oil exports can be considered as the second-largest export commodity over the 
period under review after gold exports. On average the share of crude oil exports in total 
merchandise exports is 21.9% whiles that of cocoa is 21.2% although there is wide variability 
over time.  Crude oil was the second largest export commodity between 2012 and 2014. 
However, cocoa took over as the second largest commodity in 2015 and 2016. This 
corresponds to the period of decline in crude oil prices on the international market. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, crude oil had taken the second position in 2017. 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from various Bank of Ghana quarterly statistical bulletins6 
                                                          
4 http://www.piacghana.org/portal/5/25/piac-reports 























































































































Distribution of Petroleum Receipts 
Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (PRMA) as amended Act 893 makes 
provision for spending and savings of the petroleum revenues that accrue to the government. 
The PRMA prescribes two (2) main spending paths; allocations to Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation (GNPC) which is the National Oil Company (NOC) and funding to support the 
budget (Figure 3). The PRMA also makes provision for savings for stabilisation purposes and 
future generations. This section looks at how the revenues have been distributed for spending 
and saving purposes from 2011 to 2017. 
Figure 3: Petroleum Revenue Management Framework 
 
Source: PIAC (2018)  
In terms of spending by GNPC, the law requires that at most 55% of Ghana’s net equity and 
participating interest should be allocated to GNPC to cater for its financing needs. A total 
amount of 1,239.44 million dollars was allocated to GNPC over the period under consideration. 
This represents 31% of the total petroleum revenues that accrued to the government over the 
period. The highest allocation (left scale) was in 2012, which is about 43% of the petroleum 
receipts. In general, the allocation to GNPC has been declining since 2013 and only begun to 






































































Source: Authors’ construct from various PIAC Reports  
On the other hand, the law requires that at most 70% of benchmark revenue should be used 
to fund the budget, which is known as the Annual Budgeting Funding Amount (ABFA). A total 
amount of 1,696.6 million USD of petroleum receipts was used to support the budget (see 
Figure 5). This is approximately 62% of the total benchmark oil revenue received over the 
period. The highest allocation was done in 2014 when taken on year by year basis. As usual, 
the allocations to ABFA have been volatile over the years as can be seen in Figure 6, 
increasing since the onset of oil production but started to decline in 2015.  
As indicated earlier, the law mandates the government to save for stabilisation and for future 
generations. At least 30% of the benchmark revenue should be distributed to the Ghana 
Petroleum Funds (GPFs).  As can be seen from Figure 5, a total of 1100.26 million USD was 
distributed to the GPFs. This represents 39.9% of the benchmark oil revenue. The lowest 
allocations to the GPF was done in 2012 and 2015. However, the allocations to the GPF 
exceeded the minimum amount in 3 different years (2013, 2014 and 2017). This corresponds 
to the years that the allocations to the ABFA were lesser than the maximum amount. 
Out of the total amount allocated the GPFs, an amount of 776.54 million USD and 323.72 
million USD was distributed to the GSF and GHF respectively. This translates into 71% and 
29% respectively of the total amount allocated the GPFs. Furthermore, an exception of 2011, 
the distribution to the two (2) saving funds have been done following the law, that is, 30% and 
70% of GPF to the GHF and GSF respectively. 
The foregoing suggests that exploitation of petroleum have contributed largely to Ghana’s 
export and provided the Government with some fiscal space despite forming a small portion 
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3 Governance in the Petroleum Sector 
Altruistic and self-aggrandisement Behaviour in the Oil and Gas Sector:  Theory and Practice 
According to  [13]  a behavior is considered to be altruistic if it is motivated by a genuine desire 
to benefit another person,without any expectation of benefits to oneself.  [14] however 
posit that both the reciprosity (See [15]) and the kingship (see  [16])theories explain that 
altruistic beahviour can be conditional. In the case of the reciprosity theory, individuals 
and firms work hard to induce a sense of gratitude for past “favors”, whether real or 
imagined. In the context of Ghana, political appointments to the the Ministry of Energy 
are often guided by competence but also, the past contribution of the individual to the 
political part in power, the campaign of the presidential candidate and the region where 
the individual hails from. In the kingship theory, beneficiaries of an action  should be 
very close relatives, while reciprocity theory implies that beneficent behavior should be 
directed towards those with a high probability of reciprocating [14]. Over the last two 
decades, the concept of ‘family and friends’ governance has become more pronounced 
in Ghana’s governance systems. Often, the loopsholes and numerous discretionariy 
provisions are exploited to pursue these conditional altruistic behavior. The other form 
of behavior, which is the self-aggrandisement, manifests in corruption, rent seeking and 
other anti-development actions which enriches the individual a the expense of the state. 
The concept of good governance provides a plethora of long menu of institutional changes 
and capacity-building initiatives that are considered vital for development and shape 
individual and institutational behaviour  [17]. 
Good Governance in the Oil and Gas Industry:  Theory and Practice 
The concept of good governance provides a plethora of long menu of institutional changes 
and capacity-building initiatives that are considered vital for development (Grindle, 2007)[17]. 
These factors include strong institutions, competent human capital, accountability and 
transparency mechanisms, laws and policies and their implementation. According to Kofi 
Annan7, a former UN General Secretary, good governance is ensuring respect for human 
rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in 
public administration. The World Bank8, on the other hand, describes governance as the way 
power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources and 
identifies three main strands.  These are 
(i) the type of political regime;  
(ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's 
economic and social resources for development; and  
(iii)  the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and 
discharge functions." 
In the absence of good governance, McPherson and MacSearraigh (2007)[18] posit that 
several forms of corruption can exist. These include policy corruption, administrative 
corruption, commercial corruption, and diversification of massive amounts of money through 
the diversion of production, products, or revenues known as grand corruption. Indeed, the 
absence of good governance has been identified as a significant cause of the oil curse. 
According to Rahman (2016) [19], the concept of governance started replacing ‘government’ 
in the policy literature for two reasons. First, sovereign government’s control of service 
delivery, information and decisions were undermined by the flow of power away from 
traditional government institutions upwards to transnational bodies and downwards to regions 
and sub-regions the rise of global markets, the increasing importance of networks and social 
                                                          
7 See p 2. See http://www.soc.titech.acjp/uem/governance.html.  
8 World Bank(1994), Governance: The World Bank's Experience, Washington, DC: The 
World Bank, p xiv.  
 












































































partnerships, greater access to information, and growing social complexity are usually held 
accountable for this.  
Also, citizens started making demands for accountability that challenged the state’s monopoly 
to expertise (Newman, 2001) [20]. Singh (2003) [21] recounts that the concept of good 
governance first appeared in a World Bank’s report on Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis 
to Sustainable Growth, published in 1989. In the report, the World Bank described 
Africa’s problem as a crisis of governance.(Singh, 2003) [21]. Governance in Ghana’s 
Petroleum Sector. 
 
Indeed, Ghana has put in place several governance initiatives since the discovery of oil in 
2007 in commercial quantities.  Governance has become necessary, especially since oil 
resources are non-renewable. Some of these measures seek to either guard broadly all 
sectors of the economy or are specific to the extractive sector. This has improved governance 
issues in the extractive sector making citizens aware of the challenges and goodwill for Ghana. 
Some of these measures are highlighted below, categorised into laws and regulations, and 
other locally-adopted international conventions.  
UN Convention on Anticorruption: The UN Convention on Anticorruption came into force 
on the 14th  December 2005 to strengthen efforts to curb the rate of corruption across the 
world. Ghana signed onto the UN Convention against Corruption on December 9, 2004. 
Ghana is not just a signatory to this convention but rather a State Party. The Convention had 
three main purposes which include Promoting and strengthening measures aimed at 
preventing and combating corruption; Promote, facilitate and support international cooperation 
and technical assistance; and Promote integrity, accountability and proper management of 
public property. 
International Aid Transparency Initiative: This was an initiative launched in Accra, Ghana, 
at a high-level forum on Aid Effectiveness on 4th  September 2008. It was done for the 
enablement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals to be achieved. It was 
organized to know the gaps between the Non-Governmental Organizations (CSO) and the 
Ministries of state making sure that funds that are supposed to be used for development are 
not channelled into other projects which have not yet been considered. This initiative allows 
aid donors to publish their reports on aids whiles the government does the same to make sure 
funds allocated are not misused. The International Aid Transparency Initiative focuses on four 
major objectives namely: 
● Regular public disclosure of detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and 
when, available results of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, 
accounting, and audit by developing countries. 
● Support information systems for managing aid. 
● Access to full and timely information on annual commitments and disbursements of 
aids. 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): The Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) is a global standard that seeks to ensure openness, accountability and 
responsible financial management in the extractive industry (oil, gas and mining). EITI was 
instituted by Transparency international. Transparency international begun during the 1990s 
when there was little or no disclosure of information. Transparency international begun in May 
1993 as an anti-corruption initiative. In 1995, the Corruption Perception Index was developed. 
In 1999, Bribe payers’ index was developed to the country origin of multi-national companies 
and their susceptibility of offering bribes9   
In 2003, Ghana joined the EITI by making a public pronouncement to commit to the EITI 
standards. In 2007, Ghana became a candidate country by producing and publishing its first 








































































EITI report covering the period 2004-2006. The country finally assumed the status of a 
compliant country after completing the validation process in 2010. The country has since been 
implementing the standard to the mining sector and later extended to cover the petroleum 
sector. On the 24th of February, 2016, Ghana was honoured at the 2016 Global EITI 
Conference in Lima, Peru for turning recommendations in its EITI reports into reforms. 
Open Government Partnership: Ghana signed on to the OGP in September 2011. The OGP 
is a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to 
promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to 
strengthen governance. In the spirit of multi-stakeholder collaboration, OGP is overseen by a 
Steering Committee including representatives of governments and civil society 
organizations10. The four (4) thematic areas of OGP are Citizen Participation; Accountability 
and Technology and Innovation. The Public Sector Reform Secretariat (PSRS) under the 
Office of the President serves as the secretariat for OGP-Ghana. 
Inter-Government Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIAPA): 
GIABA is a body under the sub-regional body, Economic Commission of West African States 
(ECOWAS) of which Ghana is a member-state. It was formally founded on 9 December 1999. 
The purpose behind the formation of GIABA was to adopt and implement Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) within the sub-region. This is to 
be achieved through the following objectives which involve Protecting banking and financial 
systems of member countries against penetration by criminal proceeds; Harmonize and 
implement measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; Aid member states 
to implement the provisions of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other international 
conventions; Promote international cooperation; and Assessment of the effectiveness of 
existing AML and CFT measures. The Financial Intelligence Centre coordinates the activities 
of GIABA. 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy:  The National Anti-Corruption Strategy proposes an all-
inclusive approach to addressing the problem of corruption. These include Government, 
Citizens, Political Parties, Parliament, Anti-Corruption agencies, Electoral Commission, 
Regulatory and Oversight Bodies, and the Central Vigilance Commission. The Strategy aims 
at reducing petty corruption, grand corruption (demand and supply-side corruption), political 
corruption, administrative corruption and private sector participation in corruption. Aside the 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy, there is also the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan 
(NACAP, 2012-2021) which centres around four main areas, Building public capacity to 
condemn and fight corruption; Institutionalizing efficiency, accountability and transparency 
within public, private and not-for-profit sectors; Create a platform for individuals, media and 
civil society organisations to advance discussions on the reportage and combat of corruption 
in the country; and Proper investigation and prosecution of corrupt acts. The National Anti-
Corruption Strategy and NACAP both are interested in achieving all-inclusive participation in 
addressing the problematic concept of corruption. 
Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 821): This Act establishes the Petroleum 
Commission as the upstream regulator. The Act mandates the Petroleum Commission to 
regulate and manage the deployment of petroleum resources as well as to coordinate the 
policies in the upstream petroleum. Section 10(2) of the Act clearly extricates the Commission 
from the influence of the Minister of Energy and Petroleum. A seven-member board governs 
the Commission made up of a chairperson, the chief executive of the commission, the chief 
executive of the Ghana National Petroleum Company and four other persons one of whom 
should at least be a woman. 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815) as amended (Act 893): The 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act sets out the framework to regulate the allocation and 
management of revenues realised from Petroleum production in Ghana. Some sections of the 
Act were however amended in 2015 which was given presidential assent on 31 July 2015. 
The PRMA basically deals with what percentage of petroleum revenues should be allocated 
to the various funds such as the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation, and the Ghana Petroleum Funds (Heritage Fund and Stabilization 
                                                          




































































Fund). Aside from the allocation of revenues to these funds, the Act also stipulates what 
activities or projects these revenues going into these funds could be used to support or fund. 
Section 51 of the PRMA also establishes an independent oversight body known as the Public 
Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). PIAC is mandated to among others, monitor 
and evaluate compliance with the Act. 
Petroleum Exploration and Production (E&P) Law, 2016:  The E&P has been passed by 
parliament. The law replaces the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 1984. The law 
has provisions on reconnaissance licenses; improved fiscal terms; local content and 
management of the environment. Key transparency provisions also feature prominently in the 
law. This includes open and competitive bidding, open public tender process; public register 
of petroleum contracts. However, there is no provision on beneficial ownership disclosure. The 
current law also gives the Minister discretionary powers to set aside the outcome of an open 
and competitive process or even skip the tender process altogether.  
Since 2017, a petroleum register has been established. Also, an open and competitive bidding 
process for the award of petroleum licenses has been initiated. For the 2018/2019 licensing 
round, six (6) acreages will be awarded. Three (3) of the blocks will be awarded through an 
opening and competitive bidding process which is in line with section 10(3) of the Exploration 
and Production (E&P law and two (2) will be awarded through direct negotiations in line with 
section 10 (9) of the E&P Law. Finally, one (1) of the blocks will be given to GNPC for GNPC 
to look for strategic partners in line with section 7(9) of the E&P law.  
The foregoing suggests that Ghana’s effort in ensuring transparency and good governance 
has improved generally over the years.  We summarize in Table 1, the governance practices 
when oil production started in Ghana and 9 years after. 
4 Assessment  
To discuss the governance of the petroleum resources, we employ a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. We undertake a qualitative analysis of the performance of three (3) 
global governance indexes namely, the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, Corruption Index, 
published by the Transparency International and the Resource Governance Index, published 
by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. Out of the many governance indicators 
available, the emphasis is given to indicators that relate much to oil and gas governance. On 
this basis, the Resource Governance Index, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the 
Corruption Perception Index were selected. These indicators are themselves a host of other 
independently constructed indices developed by other entities. For these governance 
indicators, scores and trends are analysed to identify subtle governance issues. Attention is 
also given to major components of the index and their subcategories, especially those that are 
relevant to the oil and gas governance. 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is a product of Mo Ibrahim Foundation that 
measures governance in the 54 African countries.  First developed in 2007, the index currently 
consists of 191 variables from 35 sources that measure governance. The variables are 
combined to form 102 indicators, categorised into four governance dimensions – safety and 
the rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human 
development. Ghana’s governance performance as measured by the IIAG is reported in 
Figure 76  
From Figure 6, Ghana’s governance performance improved from 2008 to 2011, deteriorated 
from 2012 to 2015, improved in 2016 and further in 2017. In the past decade governance in 
Ghana improved by 0.9, from 67.2 in 2008 to 68.1 in 2017, witnessing many years of 
deterioration therein. Relating to oil production, governance improved in the years leading up 
to the era of oil production (2008 -2010) but deteriorated sharply after 2011 in the era  of oil 
production until 2016, which marked an unremarkable resurgence in good governance. 
A careful examination of the components of the index over the years, as found in the report 
indicate that though the country enjoys and has the right to take pride in its rule of law and 
national security provisions, transparency and accountability is the deterring factor to the 




































































shows, transparency and accountability correlate well with the overall governance in Ghana 
than any other indicator. Objects 3, for instance, shows the trend of transparency and 
accountability and the other poor performing sub-indicators in relation to the overall 
governance score. Transparency and Accountability are the weakest among these poor 
performing sub-categories of indicators under the four governance dimensions measured by 
IIAG.    
Transparency and Accountability is, therefore, a major factor negatively affecting governance 
in Ghana. Transparency was better in periods leading up to oil production (2008-2011) 
compared to the era of major oil production, which has seen transparency and accountability 
decline consistently. Transparency improved slightly in 2016 but hastened a fall in 2017.  
Figure 6: The Ibrahim African Governance Index and its four governance dimensions 
and some relevant indicators  
 
Source: Authors’ construct from  Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
 
Out of the four governance dimensions measured by IIAG, the leading contributor to the good 
governance in Ghana is participation and human right, followed by safety and rule of law (see 
box 2 in Figure 6). Governance relating to sustainable economic opportunity is the worst 
performer of all the four. Not surprisingly, this indicator play host to the poor performing sub-
categories of indicators exhibited in Object 3 in Figure 6, except for Transparency and 
Accountability. Of these, Public Management, Business Environment and Infrastructure spell 
doom for oil and gas production.   
From the 2017 IIAG report which ranked Ghana sixth in Africa, out of the other sub-indicators 
that are relevant to this study, access to justice and revenue mobilisation are increasingly 




































































sector and civil society participation are exhibiting warning signs. Finally, business regulatory 
environment, the effectiveness of the public service and access to public and legislative 
information are increasingly deteriorating. 
The Corruption Perception Index 
Corruption undermines countries and institutions; therefore, a globally accepted indicator of 
corruption is critical to the measure of good governance. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is 
a composite index like the IIAG and the foremost measure of corruption perception in the 
public sector across countries in the world published by Transparency International. CPI is 
available from 1995 to 2018.  
Until 2012 the scores were scaled from 0 to 10, highly corrupt to very clean (see Figure 7). In 
2012 however, Transparency International changed the methodology of the index, which 
allowed for year-on-year comparison of the score. The current CPI scores and ranks countries 
on a scale from 0 to 100, highly corrupt to very clean based on surveys of other independent 
institutions informed by the views of business folks and country experts. Thus, in this analysis, 
comparisons of the period before and after 2012 are done with caution.  The composite nature 
and breadth of the CPI make it more reliable than the individual surveys. The number of 
countries included has varied over the years. The 2018 CPI, the most recent CPI covered 180 
and utilized 13 surveys.11 For some countries, the number of surveys used was less than 13 
due to data unavailability.  
Ghana’ CPI score is not getting any better. The ratings rose from 45 in 2012 to 48 in 2014, 
declined thereafter to 40 in 2017 with little improvement to 41 in 2018, showing clearly that the 
country has not been consistent and lacks commitment in dealing with corruption. This is not 
a phenomenon pertaining only to oil the production era, but also for the period before oil 
production.  Before 2012, the CPI score, then on a scale of 0 to 10, averaged about 3.7 from 
2000 to 2011.  The year 2010, which marked the commencement of oil production in Ghana, 







Figure 7: CPI Performance of Ghana (2008 to 2018) 
                                                          
11 1.African Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2016 2.Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable 
Governance Indicators 2018 3.Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index 2017-2018 4.Economist Intelligence Unit 
Country Risk Service 2018 5.Freedom House Nations in Transit 2018 6.Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk 
Indicators 2017 7.IMD World Competitiveness Center World Competitiveness Yearbook Executive Opinion Survey 2018 
8.Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence 2018 9.The PRS Group International Country Risk Guide 
2018 10.World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2017 11. World Economic Forum Executive Opinion 






































































Source : Authors’ construct from  Transparency International, 2019  
 
However, this could not be sustained in the following year as the score fell to 3.9 in 2011. 
Under the old scale, the lowest score (3.3) was recorded in 2003 and 2006. By means of 
scores alone, it is difficult to compare CPI throughout the eighteen years. Using the trend of 
CPI Rank, as presented in Figure 7, it is possible to make a good analysis. The change in 
methodology did not distort the pattern of Ghana’s CPI performance. The trend of CPI Rank 
after 2012 is similar to the pattern in the years past. This comparison is strengthened by the 
fact that since 2008 the number of countries covered by the index has risen to 180.  
Also, the country’s CPI Rank relates much to its CPI scores, the rank mostly improves and 
when the scores improve. It is therefore just to conclude that corruption perception in Ghana 
is worsening dramatically. Ghana’s performance was an all-time low (40) in 2017 ranking 81 
and could not improve much in 2018. Political will and commitment are needed to incorporate 
anti-corruption mechanisms in every public sector activity. There is the need to “prioritize 
better rules on lobbying and political financing, make public spending and contracting more 
transparent, and make public bodies more accountable” (Transparency International, 2012). 
In the oil and gas sector, an open and competitive bidding process has been initiated to issue 
exploration. In addition, a petroleum contract database12 has been established since 2018. 
Hopefully, these interventions can help reduce corruption perception in Ghana in the future. 
The Resource Governance Index 
Unlike the IIAG and CPI, the Resource Governance Index (RGI) is sector-specific and proves 
to be the most relevant among the three governance indexes. The RGI began with the 
publication of Revenue Watch Index published in 2010 by Revenue Watch in collaboration 
with Transparency International as a measure of transparency and accountability in the Oil, 
Gas and Mining Sectors. Revenue Watch published the second Resource Governance Index 
in 2013.  The third publication - the most recent index - is the 2017 RGI published by the 
Natural Resource Governance Institute, which came out of the merger of the Revenue Watch 
and the Natural Resource Chatter.  
The RGI scores and ranks countries relying on responses of experts in the extractive 
industries to a detailed questionnaire. From 2010 to 2017 the index has varied in terms of the 
components, the number of countries covered, and the kind of resource measured. In 2010 
and 2013, for Ghana, as shown in Figure 8, the index measured governance only in the mining 
sector. It did not cover governance in the oil and gas sector. The 2013 RGI involved 58 
countries. Ghana scored 63 and ranked 15th, a remarkable improvement from 35th position 
on the 2010 RWI which scored Ghana 32.3 for the mining sector. 
                                                          




































































Figure 8: Resource Governance Index for Mining and Oil and Gas Governance in Ghana 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from  Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2018 
The 2017 RGI index is made up of data from 2014 to 2017. Ghana had a satisfactory score of 
67 out of a maximum 100 points for the oil and gas governance which ranked 13th among 89 
countries. Ghana’s oil and gas governance performed far better than its mining governance 
which scored 56 and ranked 24th.   
 
Figure 9: Details of the 2017 RGI for Ghana  
 
Source: RGI 2017, Data and Source Document 
 
Ghana     performed relatively better in oil resource management than in the 
management of the mining sector. The aggregate score for oil was 67%. Ghana placed  
13th out of 89 countries. In the mining sector, Ghana scored 56% ,placing 24 out of 89 
countries.For this study, we concentrate on governance in the oil and gas sector in the rest 
of the analysis. Details of the 2017 RGI index for oil and gas governance in Ghana are reported 
in Figure 9. It assesses policies and practices governing the oil & gas industry in Ghana. 
According to the index, oil and gas governance in Ghana is the best resource governance in 
Sub Saharan Africa. 
But for revenue management, the main component of the governance index performed 
consistently well, with value realisation (licensing, taxation, state enterprises, and 
environmental protection) and enabling environment (concerning issues of accountability, rule 
of law, stability, corruption, regulatory, among others) scoring 61 and 70 respectively. The 
governance of revenue management performed poorly with a score of 37 out of 100. The 















































































36 out of 100. The value realisation measure also composed a measure on state-owned 
enterprises of which the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, the only state enterprise of 
the oil sector in Ghana scored 75. But for its non-commercial activities and the absence of 
rules of transparency around commodity sales, GNPCs governance score could have been 
better.  
The governance of Ghana’s stabilisation fund scored 93 and ranked 2nd among sovereign 
wealth funds in resource-rich countries. However, the index reveals the need to disclose the 
asset in which the fund can invest and provide justification for the cap on the stabilisation fund, 
which has unfortunately been lowered over the years. 
4.4 World Governance Indicators 
Kaufmann et al. (2005) [23] identify the indicators of good governance as voice and 
accountability, political stability, government efficiency, regulatory quality, the rule of law and 
control of corruption. 




Source: Authors’ construct from World Bank’s Governance Indicators, 2019 
According to Figure 10, while Voice and Accountability, and Rule of Law has improved 
between 2010 and 2018, Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption and Regulatory 
Quality has declined. Political Stability is at the same level as 2010. 
From a political perspective, Torvik (2002) [23] argues that oil discovery and production 
generate incentives for rent-seeking behaviour among policymakers. According to Lane and 
Tornell (1996) [24], the oil curse is also caused by the ‘voracity effect’ in which oil revenue is 
wasted through corruption, weak governance and excessive rent-seeking among competing 
interest groups. Corruption, which is a key consequence of rent-seeking behaviour, has been 
proven to be an anti-growth factor (Bardhan, 1997) [25]. One of the determinants of rent-
seeking is governmental confusion between wealth creation and wealth extraction (Gylfason, 
2001) [26]. Economic rent is the excess of revenue derived from a certain activity over the 
sum of its supply prices of capital, labour and any other related inputs required to undertake 
the activity (Garnaut and Ross, 1983) [27]. Similarly, resource rent is the value-added of the 
                                                          
13 See https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 

















2018 0.58 0.03 -0.21 -0.08 0.07 -0.11
2010 0.51 0.03 -0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.01




































































natural resource, the difference between the revenues generated from the extraction of the 
resource and the extraction cost and the cost of factors of production and their opportunity 
cost  (Dickson, 1999) [28].  
This definition is affirmed by Watkins (2001) [29] who posits that economic rent is the value of 
the resource at the point of production less all prior costs incurred, including expected return 
on investment. These costs include wages, interest on capital, the profits of entrepreneurs and 
the reward for land. Although these present a high opportunity for job creation, Torvik (2002) 
[23] finds that oil production leads to rent-seeking entrepreneurship.  
In Ghana’s case, the emphasis has been placed on the passage of laws and the formulation 
of governance policies. In addition, several governance-related protocols have been signed 
onto. We argue that this approach has three limitations. First, the enactment of these laws and 
policies do not guarantee implementation. For instance, while section 48 of the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act mandates the Minister for Finance to publish the status of oil-
funded projects annually; this provision was not implemented until 201714 though the law was 
passed in 2011.  
Second, although the country has its specific economic, cultural and political circumstances, 
the laws are sometimes adopted wholesale from Norway or other countries considered to have 
best practices. An example is the investment of the petroleum funds outside the country which 
earns a negative interest rate in some instance while the country borrows at higher interest 
rate differentials. Even though this satisfies the concept of intergenerational equity, efforts to 
debate alternative ways to invest the petroleum funds have proven futile, since the status quo 
satisfies the ‘Norway Model’.  
Finally, the laws grant discretionary powers to the Ministers of Finance and Energy without 
any regulations or guidelines on how such discretion should be exercised. Though open and 
competitive bidding process for the award of petroleum licenses, the Minister for Energy 
earmarked three out of six blocks for non-competitive process in Ghana’s first licensing 
rounds15. Such unregulated discretion can be a source of rent-seeking. 
 
5 Discussion 
As diagnosed by the analysis above, one major challenge to good governance in Ghana is 
transparency and accountability, according to IIAG, which could provide the breeding ground 
for corruption as pointed out by the CPI. Measures of governance regarding sustainable 
economic opportunity makes the situation worse, as governance indicators such as public 
management, business environment, and infrastructure are poor. They revealed challenges 
in budgetary and financial management, corruption in the public sector, insufficient civil society 
participation, deteriorating business regulatory environment, ineffective public service and 
increased restriction in accessing public & legislative information.  
In the absence of sustainable economic opportunity, corruption ripe, peace and stability are 
threatened. Those are the general outlook of governance in the country as indicated by the 
IIAG and CPI.  They, however, cast a shadow on the oil and gas resource governance in the 
country. Lessons of the natural resource curse surrounding mineral exploitation in Ghana 
prompted measures to engender good governance in the wake of the oil find in Ghana. For 
this reason, and learning from global trends, several laws have been passed for the production 
of oil and gas and the efficient management of its revenues. These have promoted good 
governance in the oil and gas sector than there is in the mining sector, even to the extent that 
oil and gas governance in Ghana ranks first in Sub Saharan Africa.  
That notwithstanding, the 2017 RGI makes known that the standards of practice of these laws 
are well below their enactments, scoring the legal framework 70 and the implementation or 
practice, 63. This suggests a challenge with the implementation of legal frameworks of oil and 
                                                          
14 See https://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/business/economy/201805/351947.php 




































































gas in Ghana, and that the many laws as outlined in the section of this paper are in themselves 
not the end but a means to good governance.  
Furthermore, in line with the worry of over budgeting and financial management issues 
indicated by IIAG, the RGI singled out national budgeting as a major challenge to the oil and 
gas sector, scoring it 36, well below the average of all resource governance indicators 
assessed. The governance of national budgeting is weak because of the challenge of linking 
petroleum revenues to general public financial management rules that could discourage acts 
like borrowing against projected revenues, overestimating revenues and changing rules 
(NRGI, 2017) [30].  This reflects in the volatile nature of allocation to the ABFA, even to the 
extent of exceeding the 70% benchmark in 2012, with the effect of starving the stabilisation 
and heritage funds. There is a call for transparency as regards asset selection and the use of 
funds for any purpose such as the Free Senior High School (Free SHS) program. Free SHS 
program may provide intergenerational equity as defined byy Beckner (2009), [31] offering 
benefits between the present and future generations. It may also be a source of human capital 
development to generate sustainable development. However, the volatile, large and 
exhaustible nature of oil revenues requires that Free SHS is situated within a proper national 
development plan with the necessary transparency and accountability provisions. More so, 
planning regarding the use of oil revenue for any purpose is required since the economy is 
already exhibiting heavy reliance on the resource for development financing and economic 
growth. 
Moreover, analysis of the 2017 RGI revealed a problem with the non-commercial activities of 
GNPC (see Table 1). This comes in addition to GNPC’s transparency problems on rules 
regarding commodity sales. The national oil company sponsors non-commercial activities 
such as sports and entertainment, lends to the government, without any publicly known social 
investment strategy. In a recent report by ACEP16 analysing the work program of GNPC, 
ACEP (2019) [32] revealed the intention of the Corporation to spend $43.05 million of its 
revenue on Corporate Social Responsibility in the 2019 financial year. Alarming as the 
situation is, this amount represents about 254% of the total Budget of the entire Ministry of 
Energy.  
Issues regarding the publication of audited reports are also worrying. These practices create 
room for the perception of corruption and corrupt practices to thrive.  GNPC, a corporation that 
receives 55% or less of the country’s carried and participating interest, and received 31% of 
the total petroleum revenues that accrued to the government over the period 2011 - 2017, 
must be circumspect, transparent and accountable in all its activities.  
Finally, examining of IIAG, it came to light that transparency in the years preceding oil 
production was better than the level of transparency in the era of oil production. This can be 
attributed to rent-seeking behaviour which thrives in secrecy as some public officials do their 
best to frustrate measures of transparency and accountability. 
 
 






































































Table 1. Governance practices in the oil and gas sector – comparing 2011 and 2019 
Variable  2011 2019 Comments 
Oil Resource 
Ownership 
The Constitution grants ownership of 
natural resources, including petroleum to 
the state 
Both the constitution and the Petroleum and 
Exploration Law  
Session 3 of the  Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Law (2016) stipulates that 
"Petroleum existing in its natural state in, under 
or upon any land Ghana, rivers, streams, 
watercourses throughout Ghana, the exclusive 
economic zone and any area covered by the 
territorial sea or continental shelf, is the 
property of the Republic of Ghana and is 
vested in the President on behalf of and in 
trust for the people of Ghana" 
In addition to the 1992 Constitution, the 
Exploration and Production Law places 
the ownership of the petroleum 
resources in the state. Session 3 of the  
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) 
Law (2016) stipulates that "Petroleum 
existing in its natural state in, under or 
upon any land Ghana, rivers, streams, 
watercourses throughout Ghana, the 
exclusive economic zone and any area 
covered by the territorial sea or 
continental shelf, is the property of the 
Republic of Ghana and is vested in the 
President on behalf of and in trust for 
the people of Ghana" 
Licensing Process Direct negotiations had become a default 
system through which contracts were 
awarded. 
Session 10 (3) of the Petroleum Exploration 
and Production Act (2016) states that a 
Petroleum agreement shall only be entered 
into after an open, transparent and competitive 
public tender process. However, sub-section 
(9) states: "Despite subsection (3) the Minister 
may, in consultation with the commission, that 
a petroleum agreement may be entered into by 
direct negotiations where direct negotiations 
represent the most efficient manner to achieve 
optimal exploration and production of 
petroleum resources in a given area" 
In 2018, the government launched a 
licensing round for 6 blocks. For the first 
time, 3 of the blocks will be awarded 
through an open and competitive 
bidding process. However, 2 of the 
blocks will be awarded through direct 
negotiations whilst 1 will be reserved for 
the national oil company17. Whilst 
information on the three blocks 
earmarked for competitive bidding has 
been made available in accordance with 
the Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Law and expectation of Civil 
Society, there are still concerns on how 
the strategic partner of GNPC would be 
                                                           




































































selected and how the direct negotiations 
would be conducted. 
Contract Disclosure The government signed three contracts in 
2015 according to Newspaper reports. 
These are  
i. The Ghana Government/GNPC and 
ENI and Vitol contract for the Offshore 
Cape Three Point integrated oil and 
gas project  
ii. A  joint venture between Government, 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, 
Swiss African Oil Company Limited and 
PET Volta Investments for Exploration 
in the Keta Delta Block.  
iii. Petroleum Agreement by and among 
the Government of the Republic of 
Ghana, Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation, GNPC Exploration, and 
Production Company Limited and 
Springfield Exploration and Production 
Limited in respect of the Conduct of 
Exploration and Production Operations 
in the West Cape Three Points Block 2 
Offshore Ghana. A search on the 
Website of the Ministry of Petroleum18, 
the Ghana Petroleum Commission and 
the contract database of the Africa 
Centre for Energy Policy19, Open Oil 
website20, and GNPC's open data 
portal21, indicate that the government 
has not disclosed any signed contracts 
A petroleum register has been established22.   
                                                           
18 http://www.petromin.gov.gh/downloads.html  
19 http://www.acepghana.com/contract-database/  
20 http://repository.openoil.net/wiki/Ghana  
21 http://www.gnpcghana.com/open_data.html  




































































in 2015 but were ratified by parliament 
on 11 March 2016 (Order Paper, 
Resolution 10, (2)). Before 2015, the 
government's disclosure of contracts 
was due to public pressure to do so 
and also as a result of TULLOW PLC 
having made its contract with the 
government public. The government 
has not shown any commitment to 
disclose contracts in the hydrocarbon 
sector. Even though the Minister of 
Petroleum had issued a moratorium on 
oil contracts in 2014, the Ministry went 
ahead to develop contracts, which were 
ratified Parliament in March 2016.  
None of these contracts has been 
made public. Tullow's Ghana 
agreements are now up on Tullow's 




Though Section 28 of Legislative 
Instrument 1652 stipulates that the Agency 
(Environmental Protection Agency) shall 
cause to be published in the Gazette 
notification of any codes of practice, 
standards, and guidelines in connection a. 
with matters provided for under these 
Regulations for the purpose of giving 
guidance; and b. with matters relating to the 
protection, development and rehabilitation 
of the environment. Therefore, the 
environmental mitigation/management plan, 
which is provided under this Regulation 
should be published in the Gazette, only the 
Environmental mitigation plan of Sankofa 
has been public while the environmental 
management plan of Tullow was published. 
An Oil and Gas Unit has been established 





































































environmental practices of oil companies in 
line with the law. 
Management of the 
National Oil 
Company 
GNPC board comprises of seven members. 
All these people do not hold a position in 
the current government. However, Abraham 
Amaliba contested the primaries of the 
National Democratic Congress, the ruling 
party. In addition, only one audited was 
published as of 2016. Since 2017, the 
chairman of the national oil company is also 
the chairman of the ruling party. 
The current chairman of the board of directors 
is also the chairman of the ruling party. Other 
audited accounts have been published.  
There has not been much change with 
regards to corporate governance. 
Most of the Board members (four out of 
seven) of the National Oil Company are 
politically exposed persons. This implies 
that their independence from the political 




Requirements such as the publication of 
revenues received, and allocations to 
different funds were done. Though the law 
required publication of oil-funded projects, 
this was not done. Indeed, in 2015, civil 
society threatened to sue the Ministry of 
Finance to publish the list23.  
In keeping up with Section 48 of the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) as 
Amended Act (893), the Minister of Finance 
also submitted the 2015 Annual Report on the 
receipts utiliSation of the Petroleum Funds for 
2015 fiscal year to Parliament as part of the 
budget statement. The total petroleum receipt 
for 2015 was also disclosed in the 2015 
reconciliation report on the Petroleum Holding 
Fund 
There has been an improvement in 
terms of petroleum revenue 
management. There are still concerns 
on the scanty nature of oil-funded 
projects, the thinly spread, the arbitrary 
capping of the stabilisation fund and no 
public input into the selection of priority 
areas. Factors such as the passage of 
the fiscal responsibility law, the practice 
of the law such as the constitution of the 
Fiscal Council and the alignment of the 
2019 mid-year budget deficit to the law 
and the data portals established at the 
Petroleum Commission including the 
Ghana petroleum register have 
contributed to enhanced transparency in 
oil resource management. 
Source: Authors’ compilation, 2019 





































































6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The Petroleum Revenue Management Law has embedded in its good governance provisions 
on accountability and transparency. One of the unique features of the law is the active 
participation of an oversight body made up of nominated members of diverse non-
governmental groups known as the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). The 
law also mandates other institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana 
to provide a detailed report within a specified period. Quite frankly, a lot of information has 
been made available on the receipts and utilisation of petroleum revenues. However, the 
implementation of the law over the past seven (7) have proven that the law is not without 
defects.  Key among the limitations are timeliness of information, discrepancies in information 
made available to the public by various agencies, lack of detailed information on ABFA funded 
projects and spending choices by the national oil company. These weaknesses provide 
opportunities for altruistic and self-aggrandising behaviour. 
To discuss the governance of the petroleum resources within a broader context, Ghana’s 
performance on three global governance indexes was assessed. Namely, the Mo Ibrahim 
Governance Index, Corruption Index, published by the Transparency International and the 
Resource Governance Index, published by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. Out of 
the many governance indicators available, the emphasis is given to indicators that relate much 
to oil and gas governance.  
On this basis, the Resource Governance Index, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and 
the Corruption Perception Index were selected. These indicators are themselves a host of 
other independently constructed indices developed by other entities. For these governance 
indicators, scores and trends are analysed to identify subtle governance issues. Attention is 
also given to major components of the index and their subcategories, especially those that are 
relevant to the oil and gas governance. 
According to the findings, Ghana’s performance on the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index 
deteriorated between 2012 and 2015 mainly due to transparency and accountability issues. 
The index started to improve from 2016, but transparency and accountability continued to 
decline. Transparency and Accountability are the weakest among these poor performing sub-
categories of indicators under the four governance dimensions measured by IIAG.   
Transparency and Accountability is, therefore, a major factor behind the deteriorating 
governance in Ghana. Transparency was better in periods leading up to oil production (2008-
2011) compared to the era of significant oil production, which has seen transparency and 
accountability decline consistently. The year 2010, which marked the commencement of oil 
production in Ghana, recorded the highest CPI score ever under this old scale with a score of 
4.1. However, this could not be sustained in the following year as the score fell to 3.9 in 2011. 
Under the old scale, the lowest score (3.3) was recorded in 2003 and 2006. 
According to the Resource Governance Index, oil and gas governance in Ghana is the best 
resource governance in Sub Saharan Africa. However, when compared with global leaders 
like Norway, Ghana has a long way to go. But for revenue management, the main component 
of the governance index performed consistently well, with value realization (licensing, taxation, 
state enterprises, and environmental protection) and enabling environment (concerning issues 
of accountability, rule of law, stability, corruption, regulatory, among others.) scoring 61 and 
70 respectively. The governance of revenue management performed poorly with a score of 
37 out of 100.  Again, there were issues with the inadequate information on the reasons for 
capping the stabilization fund at a specified level. 
Are altruistic and self-seeking behaviour evident in Ghana’s oil and gas sectorgood 
governance and the petroleum sector awkward couple or Siamese twins? Evidence suggests 
that good governance practices are required to promote sustainable petroleum resource 
management. This implies that institutions need to be established, human capital developed, 
laws and regulations passed whilst transparency and accountability measures put in place. 
However, the presence of these systems and initiatives only partially guarantee good 
governance. The implementation, review and continual improvement in governance systems 




































































have been passed, regulatory and other relevant institutions have been established, 
scholarships have been awarded to build capacity while the Public Interest and Accountability 
Committee has been established to promote good governance. These notwithstanding, 
implementation of these laws have not been smooth. The inclusion of discretionary provisions, 
the absence of guidelines to exercise these discretionary provisions and parliament’s 
unwillingness to act on PIAC’s recommendations mean there is a general improvement in 
transparency but limited accountability. These had led to a number of cases where the laws 
that were passed, had not or partialy been followed. It has led to a situation where 
transparency has improved but accountability appears to be stagnant. 
In a nutshell, three key observations are made. First, the passage of laws and evidence of 
implementation, which are often measured by these indices measure, may not suitably tell the 
story of good governance. For instance, whilst a score will be awarded for the establishment 
of a regulator like the Petroleum Commission, effort should be made to analyse the extent to 
which the Commission has performed its core mandate. Therefore, how the laws are 
implemented should be of much interest. Second, the exercise of discretionary power by 
Ministers should be of much concern since its an avenue for conditional altruistic behaviour or 
self seeking interventions. Finally, the indices should also have a bottom-up assessment to 
ensure balance. For instance, how the implementation of laws and policies are affecting the 
livelihood of the individuals and entities who are governed. 
The study recommends that the government should implement holistically and immediately 
the governance provisions in the Petroleum Revenue Management Law. Also, though certain 
types of public disclosures may not be required by law, publishing such information can 
enhance public confidence in the petroleum governance system.0 
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Between altruism and self-aggrandisement: Transparency, 





















Effective governance of oil and gas resources has been identified as the thread that divides 
altruistic and self-aggrandising behaviour when it comes to converting their petroleum 
resources to drive sustainable inclusive growth and development. This study assesses the 
governance framework that was in place before the oil and gas find in Ghana and those that 
have been put in place post-oil and gas. We then explore the performance of Ghana on key 
global governance indicators before and after the oil find, namely the Mo Ibrahim Governance 
Index, Corruption Index and the Resource Governance Index. The following reasons motivate 
the focus on Ghana in this study: firstly, the IMF predicts that Ghana will be one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world in 2019 and beyond, mainly due to the coming on stream of 
new oil and gas fields.  Secondly, the country is relatively politically stable compared to other 
countries in the region. The findings indicate that emphasis is placed on the enactment of laws 
and policies and to some extent, evidence that these laws are implemented. The passage of 
laws does not guarantee good governance. Often, the missing link is how the laws are 
implemented. Since some of these laws have discretionary provisions, there are chances that 
indivual and institutional actors can exhibit altruistic behaviour otherwise. Global governance  
indices therefore need to consider how these laws are implemented and their potential impact 
on the governed. 
 




























































































Countries that produce natural resources tend to experience lower growth and worse 
development outcomes compared to countries that do not – the so-called “natural resource 
curse” [1].1 This phenomenon has been partially attributed to the absence of good governance 
[2];  [3]). Good governance has been considered as a significant factor that can reverse the 
resource curse, thereby translating oil rents into sustainable development (4]; [5]; [2]; [6]; [7]; 
Tsani, 2013 [8], [3]). For example,   [4] found that the differences in quality of institutions are 
the main reason why natural resources tend to be beneficial to some countries. Likewise, [5] 
showed that a resource boom would raise national incomes in the presence of robust 
institutions while it distorts the economy further in the presence of weak institutions.  
Oil and gas rents can constitute a significant budgetary instrument whose proper use is 
strongly dependent on government transparency and accountability. This money can foster 
long-term socio-economic development, but it can also be misused, for example, to extend 
the political and economic power of the ruling elite  [9]. 
In 2007, Ghana found crude oil in commercial quantities.  Since then, there have been several 
discoveries2 which are at various stages of development and production. The oil find was 
expected to have a positive effect on the economy and provide the necessary resources 
needed to pursue a sustainable development agenda ( [10], [11],  [12]). Cautioned by the 
possibility of the new oil find being a curse instead of a blessing, Ghana put in place various 
measures aimed at improving governance in the petroleum sector and the broader economy 
such as the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA). However, the critical policy-
relevant questions remain: (1) has governance improved or deteriorated in Ghana since the 
                                                          
1 See Badeeb et al., (2017) for a critical review of the evolution of the resource curse hypothesis. 





































































onset of oil and gas production?; and (2) are there positive spillover effects from the improved 
governance in the petroleum sector to the broader economy?  
This study assesses the governance framework that was in place before the oil and gas find 
and those that have been put in place post-oil and gas. We then explore the performance of 
Ghana on key global governance indicators before and after the oil find. The following reasons 
motivate the focus on Ghana in this study; firstly, the IMF predicts that Ghana will be one of 
the fastest-growing economies in the world in 2019 mainly due to the coming on stream of 
new oil and gas fields.  Secondly, the country is considered to be relatively politically stable 
compared to other countries in the region. The country has undergone seven (7) successive 
elections from 1992 to 2016 which resulted in a peaceful transition of power between the two 
(2) main political parties. This has made the country one of the preferred investment 
destinations in Africa3. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 looks at the contribution of petroleum 
revenues to Ghana’s economy from 2011 to 2017.  In Section 3,  we discuss governance in 
the petroleum sector while Section 4 discusses the methodology used in this paper and key 
findings. In Section 5, we discuss the findings in the context of Ghana’s petroleum sector while 
the conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2 Oil and Gas and the Ghanaian Economy  
A total amount of 3,993.7 million USD was accrued from the exploitation of petroleum from 
2011 to 2017, as shown in Figure 1. The inflow of petroleum revenues have experienced a 
steady increase from 2011 to 2014  but started to decline in 2015. As expected, the pattern of 
receipts tends to mimic the movement in oil prices. 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from various PIAC Reports4 
**Where the line is average Brent crude oil price 
 
On average, petroleum revenues contributed 4.2% and 0.9% to domestic revenues and GDP, 
respectively.5 The highest contribution was in 2014. Not surprisingly, this is the year that the 
receipt of petroleum revenues was highest over the period under consideration. In terms of 
export, crude oil exports can be considered as the second-largest export commodity over the 
period under review after gold exports. On average the share of crude oil exports in total 
merchandise exports is 21.9% whiles that of cocoa is 21.2% although there is wide variability 
over time.  Crude oil was the second largest export commodity between 2012 and 2014. 
                                                          
3 Enst and Young Attractivenes Africa, 2018 https://jcs.com.gh/newsletter/2018/11/30/ghana-moves-up-in-
fdi-investment-countries-in-africa/ 
4 http://www.piacghana.org/portal/5/25/piac-reports 






































































































However, cocoa took over as the second largest commodity in 2015 and 2016. This 
corresponds to the period of decline in crude oil prices on the international market. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, crude oil had taken the second position in 2017. 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from various Bank of Ghana quarterly statistical bulletins6 
Distribution of Petroleum Receipts 
Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (PRMA) as amended Act 893 makes 
provision for spending and savings of the petroleum revenues that accrue to the government. 
The PRMA prescribes two (2) main spending paths; allocations to Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation (GNPC) which is the National Oil Company (NOC) and funding to support the 
budget (Figure 3). The PRMA also makes provision for savings for stabilisation purposes and 
future generations. This section looks at how the revenues have been distributed for spending 
and saving purposes from 2011 to 2017. 
Figure 3: Petroleum Revenue Management Framework 






















































































Source: PIAC (2018)  
In terms of spending by GNPC, the law requires that at most 55% of Ghana’s net equity and 
participating interest should be allocated to GNPC to cater for its financing needs. A total 
amount of 1,239.44 million dollars was allocated to GNPC over the period under consideration. 
This represents 31% of the total petroleum revenues that accrued to the government over the 
period. The highest allocation (left scale) was in 2012, which is about 43% of the petroleum 
receipts. In general, the allocation to GNPC has been declining since 2013 and only begun to 














































































































Source: Authors’ construct from various PIAC Reports  
On the other hand, the law requires that at most 70% of benchmark revenue should be used 
to fund the budget, which is known as the Annual Budgeting Funding Amount (ABFA). A total 
amount of 1,696.6 million USD of petroleum receipts was used to support the budget (see 
Figure 5). This is approximately 62% of the total benchmark oil revenue received over the 
period. The highest allocation was done in 2014 when taken on year by year basis. As usual, 
the allocations to ABFA have been volatile over the years as can be seen in Figure 6, 
increasing since the onset of oil production but started to decline in 2015.  
As indicated earlier, the law mandates the government to save for stabilisation and for future 
generations. At least 30% of the benchmark revenue should be distributed to the Ghana 
Petroleum Funds (GPFs).  As can be seen from Figure 5, a total of 1100.26 million USD was 
distributed to the GPFs. This represents 39.9% of the benchmark oil revenue. The lowest 
allocations to the GPF was done in 2012 and 2015. However, the allocations to the GPF 
exceeded the minimum amount in 3 different years (2013, 2014 and 2017). This corresponds 
to the years that the allocations to the ABFA were lesser than the maximum amount. 
Out of the total amount allocated the GPFs, an amount of 776.54 million USD and 323.72 
million USD was distributed to the GSF and GHF respectively. This translates into 71% and 
29% respectively of the total amount allocated the GPFs. Furthermore, an exception of 2011, 
the distribution to the two (2) saving funds have been done following the law, that is, 30% and 
70% of GPF to the GHF and GSF respectively. 
The foregoing suggests that exploitation of petroleum have contributed largely to Ghana’s 
export and provided the Government with some fiscal space despite forming a small portion 
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3 Governance in the Petroleum Sector 
Altruistic and self-aggrandisement Behaviour in the Oil and Gas Sector:  Theory and Practice 
According to [13]  a behavior is considered to be altruistic if it is motivated by a genuine desire 
to benefit another person,without any expectation of benefits to oneself. [14] however 
posit that both the reciprosity (See [15]) and the kingship (see [16])theories explain that 
altruistic beahviour can be conditional. In the case of the reciprosity theory, individuals 
and firms work hard to induce a sense of gratitude for past “favors”, whether real or 
imagined. In the context of Ghana, political appointments to the the Ministry of Energy 
are often guided by competence but also, the past contribution of the individual to the 
political part in power, the campaign of the presidential candidate and the region where 
the individual hails from. In the kingship theory, beneficiaries of an action  should be 
very close relatives, while reciprocity theory implies that beneficent behavior should be 
directed towards those with a high probability of reciprocating [14]. Over the last two 
decades, the concept of ‘family and friends’ governance has become more pronounced 
in Ghana’s governance systems. Often, the loopsholes and numerous discretionariy 
provisions are exploited to pursue these conditional altruistic behavior. The other form 
of behavior, which is the self-aggrandisement, manifests in corruption, rent seeking and 
other anti-development actions which enriches the individual a the expense of the state. 
The concept of good governance provides a plethora of long menu of institutional changes 
and capacity-building initiatives that are considered vital for development and shape 
individual and institutational behaviour [17]. 
The concept of good governance provides a plethora of long menu of institutional changes 
and capacity-building initiatives that are considered vital for development [17]. These factors 
include strong institutions, competent human capital, accountability and transparency 
mechanisms, laws and policies and their implementation. According to Kofi Annan7, a former 
UN General Secretary, good governance is ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of 
law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration. 
The World Bank8, on the other hand, describes governance as the way power is exercised in 
the management of a country's economic and social resources and identifies three main 
strands.  These are 
(i) the type of political regime;  
(ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's 
economic and social resources for development; and  
(iii)  the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and 
discharge functions." 
In the absence of good governance, [18] posit that several forms of corruption can exist. These 
include policy corruption, administrative corruption, commercial corruption, and diversification 
of massive amounts of money through the diversion of production, products, or revenues 
known as grand corruption. Indeed, the absence of good governance has been identified as 
a significant cause of the oil curse. 
According to [19], the concept of governance started replacing ‘government’ in the policy 
literature for two reasons. First, sovereign government’s control of service delivery, information 
and decisions were undermined by the flow of power away from traditional government 
institutions upwards to transnational bodies and downwards to regions and sub-regions the 
rise of global markets, the increasing importance of networks and social partnerships, greater 
access to information, and growing social complexity are usually held accountable for this.  
                                                          
7 See p 2. See http://www.soc.titech.acjp/uem/governance.html.  
8 World Bank(1994), Governance: The World Bank's Experience, Washington, DC: The 





































































Also, citizens started making demands for accountability that challenged the state’smonopoly 
to expertise [20]. [21] recounts that the concept of good governance first appeared in a 
World Bank’s report on Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 
published in 1989. In the report, the World Bank described Africa’s problem as a crisis 
of governance. [21]. Governance in Ghana’s Petroleum Sector. 
 
Indeed, Ghana has put in place several governance initiatives since the discovery of oil in 
2007 in commercial quantities.  Governance has become necessary, especially since oil 
resources are non-renewable. Some of these measures seek to either guard broadly all 
sectors of the economy or are specific to the extractive sector. This has improved governance 
issues in the extractive sector making citizens aware of the challenges and goodwill for Ghana. 
Some of these measures are highlighted below, categorised into laws and regulations, and 
other locally-adopted international conventions.  
UN Convention on Anticorruption: The UN Convention on Anticorruption came into force 
on the 14th  December 2005 to strengthen efforts to curb the rate of corruption across the 
world. Ghana signed onto the UN Convention against Corruption on December 9, 2004. 
Ghana is not just a signatory to this convention but rather a State Party. The Convention had 
three main purposes which include Promoting and strengthening measures aimed at 
preventing and combating corruption; Promote, facilitate and support international cooperation 
and technical assistance; and Promote integrity, accountability and proper management of 
public property. 
International Aid Transparency Initiative: This was an initiative launched in Accra, Ghana, 
at a high-level forum on Aid Effectiveness on 4th  September 2008. It was done for the 
enablement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals to be achieved. It was 
organized to know the gaps between the Non-Governmental Organizations (CSO) and the 
Ministries of state making sure that funds that are supposed to be used for development are 
not channelled into other projects which have not yet been considered. This initiative allows 
aid donors to publish their reports on aids whiles the government does the same to make sure 
funds allocated are not misused. The International Aid Transparency Initiative focuses on four 
major objectives namely: 
● Regular public disclosure of detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and 
when, available results of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, 
accounting, and audit by developing countries. 
● Support information systems for managing aid. 
● Access to full and timely information on annual commitments and disbursements of 
aids. 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): The Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) is a global standard that seeks to ensure openness, accountability and 
responsible financial management in the extractive industry (oil, gas and mining). EITI was 
instituted by Transparency international. Transparency international begun during the 1990s 
when there was little or no disclosure of information. Transparency international begun in May 
1993 as an anti-corruption initiative. In 1995, the Corruption Perception Index was developed. 
In 1999, Bribe payers’ index was developed to the country origin of multi-national companies 
and their susceptibility of offering bribes9   
In 2003, Ghana joined the EITI by making a public pronouncement to commit to the EITI 
standards. In 2007, Ghana became a candidate country by producing and publishing its first 
EITI report covering the period 2004-2006. The country finally assumed the status of a 
compliant country after completing the validation process in 2010. The country has since been 
implementing the standard to the mining sector and later extended to cover the petroleum 







































































sector. On the 24th of February, 2016, Ghana was honoured at the 2016 Global EITI 
Conference in Lima, Peru for turning recommendations in its EITI reports into reforms. 
Open Government Partnership: Ghana signed on to the OGP in September 2011. The OGP 
is a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to 
promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to 
strengthen governance. In the spirit of multi-stakeholder collaboration, OGP is overseen by a 
Steering Committee including representatives of governments and civil society 
organizations10. The four (4) thematic areas of OGP are Citizen Participation; Accountability 
and Technology and Innovation. The Public Sector Reform Secretariat (PSRS) under the 
Office of the President serves as the secretariat for OGP-Ghana. 
Inter-Government Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIAPA): 
GIABA is a body under the sub-regional body, Economic Commission of West African States 
(ECOWAS) of which Ghana is a member-state. It was formally founded on 9 December 1999. 
The purpose behind the formation of GIABA was to adopt and implement Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) within the sub-region. This is to 
be achieved through the following objectives which involve Protecting banking and financial 
systems of member countries against penetration by criminal proceeds; Harmonize and 
implement measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; Aid member states 
to implement the provisions of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other international 
conventions; Promote international cooperation; and Assessment of the effectiveness of 
existing AML and CFT measures. The Financial Intelligence Centre coordinates the activities 
of GIABA. 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy:  The National Anti-Corruption Strategy proposes an all-
inclusive approach to addressing the problem of corruption. These include Government, 
Citizens, Political Parties, Parliament, Anti-Corruption agencies, Electoral Commission, 
Regulatory and Oversight Bodies, and the Central Vigilance Commission. The Strategy aims 
at reducing petty corruption, grand corruption (demand and supply-side corruption), political 
corruption, administrative corruption and private sector participation in corruption. Aside the 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy, there is also the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan 
(NACAP, 2012-2021) which centres around four main areas, Building public capacity to 
condemn and fight corruption; Institutionalizing efficiency, accountability and transparency 
within public, private and not-for-profit sectors; Create a platform for individuals, media and 
civil society organisations to advance discussions on the reportage and combat of corruption 
in the country; and Proper investigation and prosecution of corrupt acts. The National Anti-
Corruption Strategy and NACAP both are interested in achieving all-inclusive participation in 
addressing the problematic concept of corruption. 
Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 821): This Act establishes the Petroleum 
Commission as the upstream regulator. The Act mandates the Petroleum Commission to 
regulate and manage the deployment of petroleum resources as well as to coordinate the 
policies in the upstream petroleum. Section 10(2) of the Act clearly extricates the Commission 
from the influence of the Minister of Energy and Petroleum. A seven-member board governs 
the Commission made up of a chairperson, the chief executive of the commission, the chief 
executive of the Ghana National Petroleum Company and four other persons one of whom 
should at least be a woman. 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815) as amended (Act 893): The 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act sets out the framework to regulate the allocation and 
management of revenues realised from Petroleum production in Ghana. Some sections of the 
Act were however amended in 2015 which was given presidential assent on 31 July 2015. 
The PRMA basically deals with what percentage of petroleum revenues should be allocated 
to the various funds such as the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation, and the Ghana Petroleum Funds (Heritage Fund and Stabilization 
Fund). Aside from the allocation of revenues to these funds, the Act also stipulates what 
activities or projects these revenues going into these funds could be used to support or fund. 
Section 51 of the PRMA also establishes an independent oversight body known as the Public 
                                                          




































































Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). PIAC is mandated to among others, monitor 
and evaluate compliance with the Act. 
Petroleum Exploration and Production (E&P) Law, 2016:  The E&P has been passed by 
parliament. The law replaces the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 1984. The law 
has provisions on reconnaissance licenses; improved fiscal terms; local content and 
management of the environment. Key transparency provisions also feature prominently in the 
law. This includes open and competitive bidding, open public tender process; public register 
of petroleum contracts. However, there is no provision on beneficial ownership disclosure. The 
current law also gives the Minister discretionary powers to set aside the outcome of an open 
and competitive process or even skip the tender process altogether.  
Since 2017, a petroleum register has been established. Also, an open and competitive bidding 
process for the award of petroleum licenses has been initiated. For the 2018/2019 licensing 
round, six (6) acreages will be awarded. Three (3) of the blocks will be awarded through an 
opening and competitive bidding process which is in line with section 10(3) of the Exploration 
and Production (E&P law and two (2) will be awarded through direct negotiations in line with 
section 10 (9) of the E&P Law. Finally, one (1) of the blocks will be given to GNPC for GNPC 
to look for strategic partners in line with section 7(9) of the E&P law.  
The foregoing suggests that Ghana’s effort in ensuring transparency and good governance 
has improved generally over the years.  We summarize in Table 1, the governance practices 
when oil production started in Ghana and 9 years after. 
4 Assessment  
To discuss the governance of the petroleum resources, we employ a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. We undertake a qualitative analysis of the performance of three (3) 
global governance indexes namely, the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, Corruption Index, 
published by the Transparency International and the Resource Governance Index, published 
by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. Out of the many governance indicators 
available, the emphasis is given to indicators that relate much to oil and gas governance. On 
this basis, the Resource Governance Index, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the 
Corruption Perception Index were selected. These indicators are themselves a host of other 
independently constructed indices developed by other entities. For these governance 
indicators, scores and trends are analysed to identify subtle governance issues. Attention is 
also given to major components of the index and their subcategories, especially those that are 
relevant to the oil and gas governance. 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is a product of Mo Ibrahim Foundation that 
measures governance in the 54 African countries.  First developed in 2007, the index currently 
consists of 191 variables from 35 sources that measure governance. The variables are 
combined to form 102 indicators, categorised into four governance dimensions – safety and 
the rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human 
development. Ghana’s governance performance as measured by the IIAG is reported in 
Figure 76  
From Figure 6, Ghana’s governance performance improved from 2008 to 2011, deteriorated 
from 2012 to 2015, improved in 2016 and further in 2017. In the past decade governance in 
Ghana improved by 0.9, from 67.2 in 2008 to 68.1 in 2017, witnessing many years of 
deterioration therein. Relating to oil production, governance improved in the years leading up 
to the era of oil production (2008 -2010) but deteriorated sharply after 2011 in the era  of oil 
production until 2016, which marked an unremarkable resurgence in good governance. 
A careful examination of the components of the index over the years, as found in the report 
indicate that though the country enjoys and has the right to take pride in its rule of law and 
national security provisions, transparency and accountability is the deterring factor to the 
country’s safety and rule of law as well as  overall governance. As Object 1 and 3 in Figure 6 
shows, transparency and accountability correlate well with the overall governance in Ghana 
than any other indicator. Objects 3, for instance, shows the trend of transparency and 




































































governance score. Transparency and Accountability are the weakest among these poor 
performing sub-categories of indicators under the four governance dimensions measured by 
IIAG.    
Transparency and Accountability is, therefore, a major factor negatively affecting governance 
in Ghana. Transparency was better in periods leading up to oil production (2008-2011) 
compared to the era of major oil production, which has seen transparency and accountability 
decline consistently. Transparency improved slightly in 2016 but hastened a fall in 2017.  
Figure 6: The Ibrahim African Governance Index and its four governance dimensions 
and some relevant indicators  
 
Source: Authors’ construct from  Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
 
Out of the four governance dimensions measured by IIAG, the leading contributor to the good 
governance in Ghana is participation and human right, followed by safety and rule of law (see 
box 2 in Figure 6). Governance relating to sustainable economic opportunity is the worst 
performer of all the four. Not surprisingly, this indicator play host to the poor performing sub-
categories of indicators exhibited in Object 3 in Figure 6, except for Transparency and 
Accountability. Of these, Public Management, Business Environment and Infrastructure spell 
doom for oil and gas production.   
From the 2017 IIAG report which ranked Ghana sixth in Africa, out of the other sub-indicators 
that are relevant to this study, access to justice and revenue mobilisation are increasingly 
improving; whilst budgetary and financial management, absence of corruption in the public 
sector and civil society participation are exhibiting warning signs. Finally, business regulatory 
environment, the effectiveness of the public service and access to public and legislative 




































































The Corruption Perception Index 
Corruption undermines countries and institutions; therefore, a globally accepted indicator of 
corruption is critical to the measure of good governance. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is 
a composite index like the IIAG and the foremost measure of corruption perception in the 
public sector across countries in the world published by Transparency International. CPI is 
available from 1995 to 2018.  
Until 2012 the scores were scaled from 0 to 10, highly corrupt to very clean (see Figure 7). In 
2012 however, Transparency International changed the methodology of the index, which 
allowed for year-on-year comparison of the score. The current CPI scores and ranks countries 
on a scale from 0 to 100, highly corrupt to very clean based on surveys of other independent 
institutions informed by the views of business folks and country experts. Thus, in this analysis, 
comparisons of the period before and after 2012 are done with caution.  The composite nature 
and breadth of the CPI make it more reliable than the individual surveys. The number of 
countries included has varied over the years. The 2018 CPI, the most recent CPI covered 180 
and utilized 13 surveys.11 For some countries, the number of surveys used was less than 13 
due to data unavailability.  
Ghana’ CPI score is not getting any better. The ratings rose from 45 in 2012 to 48 in 2014, 
declined thereafter to 40 in 2017 with little improvement to 41 in 2018, showing clearly that the 
country has not been consistent and lacks commitment in dealing with corruption. This is not 
a phenomenon pertaining only to oil the production era, but also for the period before oil 
production.  Before 2012, the CPI score, then on a scale of 0 to 10, averaged about 3.7 from 
2000 to 2011.  The year 2010, which marked the commencement of oil production in Ghana, 







Figure 7: CPI Performance of Ghana (2008 to 2018) 
                                                          
11 1.African Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2016 2.Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable 
Governance Indicators 2018 3.Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index 2017-2018 4.Economist Intelligence Unit 
Country Risk Service 2018 5.Freedom House Nations in Transit 2018 6.Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk 
Indicators 2017 7.IMD World Competitiveness Center World Competitiveness Yearbook Executive Opinion Survey 2018 
8.Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence 2018 9.The PRS Group International Country Risk Guide 
2018 10.World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2017 11. World Economic Forum Executive Opinion 






































































Source : Authors’ construct from  Transparency International, 2019  
 
However, this could not be sustained in the following year as the score fell to 3.9 in 2011. 
Under the old scale, the lowest score (3.3) was recorded in 2003 and 2006. By means of 
scores alone, it is difficult to compare CPI throughout the eighteen years. Using the trend of 
CPI Rank, as presented in Figure 7, it is possible to make a good analysis. The change in 
methodology did not distort the pattern of Ghana’s CPI performance. The trend of CPI Rank 
after 2012 is similar to the pattern in the years past. This comparison is strengthened by the 
fact that since 2008 the number of countries covered by the index has risen to 180.  
Also, the country’s CPI Rank relates much to its CPI scores, the rank mostly improves and 
when the scores improve. It is therefore just to conclude that corruption perception in Ghana 
is worsening dramatically. Ghana’s performance was an all-time low (40) in 2017 ranking 81 
and could not improve much in 2018. Political will and commitment are needed to incorporate 
anti-corruption mechanisms in every public sector activity. There is the need to “prioritize 
better rules on lobbying and political financing, make public spending and contracting more 
transparent, and make public bodies more accountable” (Transparency International, 2012). 
In the oil and gas sector, an open and competitive bidding process has been initiated to issue 
exploration. In addition, a petroleum contract database12 has been established since 2018. 
Hopefully, these interventions can help reduce corruption perception in Ghana in the future. 
The Resource Governance Index 
Unlike the IIAG and CPI, the Resource Governance Index (RGI) is sector-specific and proves 
to be the most relevant among the three governance indexes. The RGI began with the 
publication of Revenue Watch Index published in 2010 by Revenue Watch in collaboration 
with Transparency International as a measure of transparency and accountability in the Oil, 
Gas and Mining Sectors. Revenue Watch published the second Resource Governance Index 
in 2013.  The third publication - the most recent index - is the 2017 RGI published by the 
Natural Resource Governance Institute, which came out of the merger of the Revenue Watch 
and the Natural Resource Chatter.  
The RGI scores and ranks countries relying on responses of experts in the extractive 
industries to a detailed questionnaire. From 2010 to 2017 the index has varied in terms of the 
components, the number of countries covered, and the kind of resource measured. In 2010 
and 2013, for Ghana, as shown in Figure 8, the index measured governance only in the mining 
sector. It did not cover governance in the oil and gas sector. The 2013 RGI involved 58 
countries. Ghana scored 63 and ranked 15th, a remarkable improvement from 35th position 
on the 2010 RWI which scored Ghana 32.3 for the mining sector. 
                                                          




































































Figure 8: Resource Governance Index for Mining and Oil and Gas Governance in Ghana 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from  Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2018 
The 2017 RGI index is made up of data from 2014 to 2017. Ghana had a satisfactory score of 
67 out of a maximum 100 points for the oil and gas governance which ranked 13th among 89 
countries. Ghana’s oil and gas governance performed far better than its mining governance 
which scored 56 and ranked 24th.   
 
Figure 9: Details of the 2017 RGI for Ghana  
 
Source: RGI 2017, Data and Source Document 
 
Ghana     performed relatively better in oil resource management than in the 
management of the mining sector. The aggregate score for oil was 67%. Ghana placed  
13th out of 89 countries. In the mining sector, Ghana scored 56% ,placing 24 out of 89 
countries.For this study, we concentrate on governance in the oil and gas sector in the rest 
of the analysis. Details of the 2017 RGI index for oil and gas governance in Ghana are reported 
in Figure 9. It assesses policies and practices governing the oil & gas industry in Ghana. 
According to the index, oil and gas governance in Ghana is the best resource governance in 
Sub Saharan Africa. 
But for revenue management, the main component of the governance index performed 
consistently well, with value realisation (licensing, taxation, state enterprises, and 
environmental protection) and enabling environment (concerning issues of accountability, rule 
of law, stability, corruption, regulatory, among others) scoring 61 and 70 respectively. The 
governance of revenue management performed poorly with a score of 37 out of 100. The 















































































36 out of 100. The value realisation measure also composed a measure on state-owned 
enterprises of which the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, the only state enterprise of 
the oil sector in Ghana scored 75. But for its non-commercial activities and the absence of 
rules of transparency around commodity sales, GNPCs governance score could have been 
better.  
The governance of Ghana’s stabilisation fund scored 93 and ranked 2nd among sovereign 
wealth funds in resource-rich countries. However, the index reveals the need to disclose the 
asset in which the fund can invest and provide justification for the cap on the stabilisation fund, 
which has unfortunately been lowered over the years. 
4.4 World Governance Indicators 
 [23] identify the indicators of good governance as voice and accountability, political stability, 
government efficiency, regulatory quality, the rule of law and control of corruption. 




Source: Authors’ construct from World Bank’s Governance Indicators, 2019 
According to Figure 10, while Voice and Accountability, and Rule of Law has improved 
between 2010 and 2018, Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption and Regulatory 
Quality has declined. Political Stability is at the same level as 2010. 
From a political perspective, [23] argues that oil discovery and production generate incentives 
for rent-seeking behaviour among policymakers. According to [24], the oil curse is also caused 
by the ‘voracity effect’ in which oil revenue is wasted through corruption, weak governance 
and excessive rent-seeking among competing interest groups. Corruption, which is a key 
consequence of rent-seeking behaviour, has been proven to be an anti-growth factor ( [25]. 
One of the determinants of rent-seeking is governmental confusion between wealth creation 
and wealth extraction  [26]. Economic rent is the excess of revenue derived from a certain 
activity over the sum of its supply prices of capital, labour and any other related inputs required 
to undertake the activity) [27]. Similarly, resource rent is the value-added of the natural 
resource, the difference between the revenues generated from the extraction of the resource 
and the extraction cost and the cost of factors of production and their opportunity cost [28].  
                                                          
13 See https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 

















2018 0.58 0.03 -0.21 -0.08 0.07 -0.11
2010 0.51 0.03 -0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.01




































































This definition is affirmed by [29] who posits that economic rent is the value of the resource at 
the point of production less all prior costs incurred, including expected return on investment. 
These costs include wages, interest on capital, the profits of entrepreneurs and the reward for 
land. Although these present a high opportunity for job creation, [23] finds that oil production 
leads to rent-seeking entrepreneurship.  
In Ghana’s case, the emphasis has been placed on the passage of laws and the formulation 
of governance policies. In addition, several governance-related protocols have been signed 
onto. We argue that this approach has three limitations. First, the enactment of these laws and 
policies do not guarantee implementation. For instance, while section 48 of the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act mandates the Minister for Finance to publish the status of oil-
funded projects annually; this provision was not implemented until 201714 though the law was 
passed in 2011.  
Second, although the country has its specific economic, cultural and political circumstances, 
the laws are sometimes adopted wholesale from Norway or other countries considered to have 
best practices. An example is the investment of the petroleum funds outside the country which 
earns a negative interest rate in some instance while the country borrows at higher interest 
rate differentials. Even though this satisfies the concept of intergenerational equity, efforts to 
debate alternative ways to invest the petroleum funds have proven futile, since the status quo 
satisfies the ‘Norway Model’.  
Finally, the laws grant discretionary powers to the Ministers of Finance and Energy without 
any regulations or guidelines on how such discretion should be exercised. Though open and 
competitive bidding process for the award of petroleum licenses, the Minister for Energy 
earmarked three out of six blocks for non-competitive process in Ghana’s first licensing 
rounds15. Such unregulated discretion can be a source of rent-seeking. 
 
5 Discussion 
As diagnosed by the analysis above, one major challenge to good governance in Ghana is 
transparency and accountability, according to IIAG, which could provide the breeding ground 
for corruption as pointed out by the CPI. Measures of governance regarding sustainable 
economic opportunity makes the situation worse, as governance indicators such as public 
management, business environment, and infrastructure are poor. They revealed challenges 
in budgetary and financial management, corruption in the public sector, insufficient civil society 
participation, deteriorating business regulatory environment, ineffective public service and 
increased restriction in accessing public & legislative information.  
In the absence of sustainable economic opportunity, corruption ripe, peace and stability are 
threatened. Those are the general outlook of governance in the country as indicated by the 
IIAG and CPI.  They, however, cast a shadow on the oil and gas resource governance in the 
country. Lessons of the natural resource curse surrounding mineral exploitation in Ghana 
prompted measures to engender good governance in the wake of the oil find in Ghana. For 
this reason, and learning from global trends, several laws have been passed for the production 
of oil and gas and the efficient management of its revenues. These have promoted good 
governance in the oil and gas sector than there is in the mining sector, even to the extent that 
oil and gas governance in Ghana ranks first in Sub Saharan Africa.  
That notwithstanding, the 2017 RGI makes known that the standards of practice of these laws 
are well below their enactments, scoring the legal framework 70 and the implementation or 
practice, 63. This suggests a challenge with the implementation of legal frameworks of oil and 
gas in Ghana, and that the many laws as outlined in the section of this paper are in themselves 
not the end but a means to good governance.  
Furthermore, in line with the worry of over budgeting and financial management issues 
indicated by IIAG, the RGI singled out national budgeting as a major challenge to the oil and 
gas sector, scoring it 36, well below the average of all resource governance indicators 
                                                          
14 See https://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/business/economy/201805/351947.php 




































































assessed. The governance of national budgeting is weak because of the challenge of linking 
petroleum revenues to general public financial management rules that could discourage acts 
like borrowing against projected revenues, overestimating revenues and changing rules [30].  
This reflects in the volatile nature of allocation to the ABFA, even to the extent of exceeding 
the 70% benchmark in 2012, with the effect of starving the stabilisation and heritage funds. 
There is a call for transparency as regards asset selection and the use of funds for any purpose 
such as the Free Senior High School (Free SHS) program. Free SHS program may provide 
intergenerational equity as defined by [31] offering benefits between the present and future 
generations. It may also be a source of human capital development to generate sustainable 
development. However, the volatile, large and exhaustible nature of oil revenues requires that 
Free SHS is situated within a proper national development plan with the necessary 
transparency and accountability provisions. More so, planning regarding the use of oil revenue 
for any purpose is required since the economy is already exhibiting heavy reliance on the 
resource for development financing and economic growth. 
Moreover, analysis of the 2017 RGI revealed a problem with the non-commercial activities of 
GNPC (see Table 1). This comes in addition to GNPC’s transparency problems on rules 
regarding commodity sales. The national oil company sponsors non-commercial activities 
such as sports and entertainment, lends to the government, without any publicly known social 
investment strategy. In a recent report by ACEP16 analysing the work program of GNPC, [32] 
revealed the intention of the Corporation to spend $43.05 million of its revenue on Corporate 
Social Responsibility in the 2019 financial year. Alarming as the situation is, this amount 
represents about 254% of the total Budget of the entire Ministry of Energy.  
Issues regarding the publication of audited reports are also worrying. These practices create 
room for the perception of corruption and corrupt practices to thrive.  GNPC, a corporation that 
receives 55% or less of the country’s carried and participating interest, and received 31% of 
the total petroleum revenues that accrued to the government over the period 2011 - 2017, 
must be circumspect, transparent and accountable in all its activities.  
Finally, examining of IIAG, it came to light that transparency in the years preceding oil 
production was better than the level of transparency in the era of oil production. This can be 
attributed to rent-seeking behaviour which thrives in secrecy as some public officials do their 
best to frustrate measures of transparency and accountability. 
 
 






































































Table 1. Governance practices in the oil and gas sector – comparing 2011 and 2019 
Variable  2011 2019 Comments 
Oil Resource 
Ownership 
The Constitution grants ownership of 
natural resources, including petroleum to 
the state 
Both the constitution and the Petroleum and 
Exploration Law  
Session 3 of the  Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Law (2016) stipulates that 
"Petroleum existing in its natural state in, under 
or upon any land Ghana, rivers, streams, 
watercourses throughout Ghana, the exclusive 
economic zone and any area covered by the 
territorial sea or continental shelf, is the 
property of the Republic of Ghana and is 
vested in the President on behalf of and in 
trust for the people of Ghana" 
In addition to the 1992 Constitution, the 
Exploration and Production Law places 
the ownership of the petroleum 
resources in the state. Session 3 of the  
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) 
Law (2016) stipulates that "Petroleum 
existing in its natural state in, under or 
upon any land Ghana, rivers, streams, 
watercourses throughout Ghana, the 
exclusive economic zone and any area 
covered by the territorial sea or 
continental shelf, is the property of the 
Republic of Ghana and is vested in the 
President on behalf of and in trust for 
the people of Ghana" 
Licensing Process Direct negotiations had become a default 
system through which contracts were 
awarded. 
Session 10 (3) of the Petroleum Exploration 
and Production Act (2016) states that a 
Petroleum agreement shall only be entered 
into after an open, transparent and competitive 
public tender process. However, sub-section 
(9) states: "Despite subsection (3) the Minister 
may, in consultation with the commission, that 
a petroleum agreement may be entered into by 
direct negotiations where direct negotiations 
represent the most efficient manner to achieve 
optimal exploration and production of 
petroleum resources in a given area" 
In 2018, the government launched a 
licensing round for 6 blocks. For the first 
time, 3 of the blocks will be awarded 
through an open and competitive 
bidding process. However, 2 of the 
blocks will be awarded through direct 
negotiations whilst 1 will be reserved for 
the national oil company17. Whilst 
information on the three blocks 
earmarked for competitive bidding has 
been made available in accordance with 
the Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Law and expectation of Civil 
Society, there are still concerns on how 
the strategic partner of GNPC would be 
                                                          




































































selected and how the direct negotiations 
would be conducted. 
Contract Disclosure The government signed three contracts in 
2015 according to Newspaper reports. 
These are  
i. The Ghana Government/GNPC and 
ENI and Vitol contract for the Offshore 
Cape Three Point integrated oil and 
gas project  
ii. A  joint venture between Government, 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, 
Swiss African Oil Company Limited and 
PET Volta Investments for Exploration 
in the Keta Delta Block.  
iii. Petroleum Agreement by and among 
the Government of the Republic of 
Ghana, Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation, GNPC Exploration, and 
Production Company Limited and 
Springfield Exploration and Production 
Limited in respect of the Conduct of 
Exploration and Production Operations 
in the West Cape Three Points Block 2 
Offshore Ghana. A search on the 
Website of the Ministry of Petroleum18, 
the Ghana Petroleum Commission and 
the contract database of the Africa 
Centre for Energy Policy19, Open Oil 
website20, and GNPC's open data 
portal21, indicate that the government 
has not disclosed any signed contracts 
A petroleum register has been established22.   
                                                          
18 http://www.petromin.gov.gh/downloads.html  
19 http://www.acepghana.com/contract-database/  
20 http://repository.openoil.net/wiki/Ghana  
21 http://www.gnpcghana.com/open_data.html  




































































in 2015 but were ratified by parliament 
on 11 March 2016 (Order Paper, 
Resolution 10, (2)). Before 2015, the 
government's disclosure of contracts 
was due to public pressure to do so 
and also as a result of TULLOW PLC 
having made its contract with the 
government public. The government 
has not shown any commitment to 
disclose contracts in the hydrocarbon 
sector. Even though the Minister of 
Petroleum had issued a moratorium on 
oil contracts in 2014, the Ministry went 
ahead to develop contracts, which were 
ratified Parliament in March 2016.  
None of these contracts has been 
made public. Tullow's Ghana 
agreements are now up on Tullow's 




Though Section 28 of Legislative 
Instrument 1652 stipulates that the Agency 
(Environmental Protection Agency) shall 
cause to be published in the Gazette 
notification of any codes of practice, 
standards, and guidelines in connection a. 
with matters provided for under these 
Regulations for the purpose of giving 
guidance; and b. with matters relating to the 
protection, development and rehabilitation 
of the environment. Therefore, the 
environmental mitigation/management plan, 
which is provided under this Regulation 
should be published in the Gazette, only the 
Environmental mitigation plan of Sankofa 
has been public while the environmental 
management plan of Tullow was published. 
An Oil and Gas Unit has been established 





































































environmental practices of oil companies in 
line with the law. 
Management of the 
National Oil 
Company 
GNPC board comprises of seven members. 
All these people do not hold a position in 
the current government. However, Abraham 
Amaliba contested the primaries of the 
National Democratic Congress, the ruling 
party. In addition, only one audited was 
published as of 2016. Since 2017, the 
chairman of the national oil company is also 
the chairman of the ruling party. 
The current chairman of the board of directors 
is also the chairman of the ruling party. Other 
audited accounts have been published.  
There has not been much change with 
regards to corporate governance. 
Most of the Board members (four out of 
seven) of the National Oil Company are 
politically exposed persons. This implies 
that their independence from the political 




Requirements such as the publication of 
revenues received, and allocations to 
different funds were done. Though the law 
required publication of oil-funded projects, 
this was not done. Indeed, in 2015, civil 
society threatened to sue the Ministry of 
Finance to publish the list23.  
In keeping up with Section 48 of the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) as 
Amended Act (893), the Minister of Finance 
also submitted the 2015 Annual Report on the 
receipts utiliSation of the Petroleum Funds for 
2015 fiscal year to Parliament as part of the 
budget statement. The total petroleum receipt 
for 2015 was also disclosed in the 2015 
reconciliation report on the Petroleum Holding 
Fund 
There has been an improvement in 
terms of petroleum revenue 
management. There are still concerns 
on the scanty nature of oil-funded 
projects, the thinly spread, the arbitrary 
capping of the stabilisation fund and no 
public input into the selection of priority 
areas. Factors such as the passage of 
the fiscal responsibility law, the practice 
of the law such as the constitution of the 
Fiscal Council and the alignment of the 
2019 mid-year budget deficit to the law 
and the data portals established at the 
Petroleum Commission including the 
Ghana petroleum register have 
contributed to enhanced transparency in 
oil resource management. 
Source: Authors’ compilation, 2019 





































































6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The Petroleum Revenue Management Law has embedded in its good governance provisions 
on accountability and transparency. One of the unique features of the law is the active 
participation of an oversight body made up of nominated members of diverse non-
governmental groups known as the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). The 
law also mandates other institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana 
to provide a detailed report within a specified period. Quite frankly, a lot of information has 
been made available on the receipts and utilisation of petroleum revenues. However, the 
implementation of the law over the past seven (7) have proven that the law is not without 
defects.  Key among the limitations are timeliness of information, discrepancies in information 
made available to the public by various agencies, lack of detailed information on ABFA funded 
projects and spending choices by the national oil company. These weaknesses provide 
opportunities for altruistic and self-aggrandising behaviour. 
To discuss the governance of the petroleum resources within a broader context, Ghana’s 
performance on three global governance indexes was assessed. Namely, the Mo Ibrahim 
Governance Index, Corruption Index, published by the Transparency International and the 
Resource Governance Index, published by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. Out of 
the many governance indicators available, the emphasis is given to indicators that relate much 
to oil and gas governance.  
On this basis, the Resource Governance Index, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and 
the Corruption Perception Index were selected. These indicators are themselves a host of 
other independently constructed indices developed by other entities. For these governance 
indicators, scores and trends are analysed to identify subtle governance issues. Attention is 
also given to major components of the index and their subcategories, especially those that are 
relevant to the oil and gas governance. 
According to the findings, Ghana’s performance on the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index 
deteriorated between 2012 and 2015 mainly due to transparency and accountability issues. 
The index started to improve from 2016, but transparency and accountability continued to 
decline. Transparency and Accountability are the weakest among these poor performing sub-
categories of indicators under the four governance dimensions measured by IIAG.   
Transparency and Accountability is, therefore, a major factor behind the deteriorating 
governance in Ghana. Transparency was better in periods leading up to oil production (2008-
2011) compared to the era of significant oil production, which has seen transparency and 
accountability decline consistently. The year 2010, which marked the commencement of oil 
production in Ghana, recorded the highest CPI score ever under this old scale with a score of 
4.1. However, this could not be sustained in the following year as the score fell to 3.9 in 2011. 
Under the old scale, the lowest score (3.3) was recorded in 2003 and 2006. 
According to the Resource Governance Index, oil and gas governance in Ghana is the best 
resource governance in Sub Saharan Africa. However, when compared with global leaders 
like Norway, Ghana has a long way to go. But for revenue management, the main component 
of the governance index performed consistently well, with value realization (licensing, taxation, 
state enterprises, and environmental protection) and enabling environment (concerning issues 
of accountability, rule of law, stability, corruption, regulatory, among others.) scoring 61 and 
70 respectively. The governance of revenue management performed poorly with a score of 
37 out of 100.  Again, there were issues with the inadequate information on the reasons for 
capping the stabilization fund at a specified level. 
Are altruistic and self-seeking behaviour evident in Ghana’s oil and gas sector? Evidence 
suggests that good governance practices are required to promote sustainable petroleum 
resource management. This implies that institutions need to be established, human capital 
developed, laws and regulations passed whilst transparency and accountability measures put 
in place. However, the presence of these systems and initiatives only partially guarantee good 
governance. The implementation, review and continual improvement in governance systems 
promote effective governance of the petroleum sector. In Ghana’s case, laws and regulations 




































































scholarships have been awarded to build capacity while the Public Interest and Accountability 
Committee has been established to promote good governance. These notwithstanding, 
implementation of these laws have not been smooth. The inclusion of discretionary provisions, 
the absence of guidelines to exercise these discretionary provisions and parliament’s 
unwillingness to act on PIAC’s recommendations mean there is a general improvement in 
transparency but limited accountability. These had led to a number of cases where the laws 
that were passed, had not or partialy been followed. It has led to a situation where 
transparency has improved but accountability appears to be stagnant. 
In a nutshell, three key observations are made. First, the passage of laws and evidence of 
implementation, which are often measured by these indices measure, may not suitably tell the 
story of good governance. For instance, whilst a score will be awarded for the establishment 
of a regulator like the Petroleum Commission, effort should be made to analyse the extent to 
which the Commission has performed its core mandate. Therefore, how the laws are 
implemented should be of much interest. Second, the exercise of discretionary power by 
Ministers should be of much concern since its an avenue for conditional altruistic behaviour or 
self seeking interventions. Finally, the indices should also have a bottom-up assessment to 
ensure balance. For instance, how the implementation of laws and policies are affecting the 
livelihood of the individuals and entities who are governed. 
The study recommends that the government should implement holistically and immediately 
the governance provisions in the Petroleum Revenue Management Law. Also, though certain 
types of public disclosures may not be required by law, publishing such information can 
enhance public confidence in the petroleum governance system.0 
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Between altruism and self-aggrandisement: Transparency, 





















Effective governance of oil and gas resources has been identified as the thread that divides 
altruistic and self-aggrandising behaviour when it comes to converting their petroleum 
resources to drive sustainable inclusive growth and developmentEffective governance of oil 
and gas resources has been identified as the thread that divides countries such as Norway 
and Nigeria when it comes to converting their petroleum resources to drive sustainable 
inclusive growth and development. This study assesses the governance framework that was 
in place before the oil and gas find in Ghana and those that have been put in place post-oil 
and gas. We then explore the performance of Ghana on key global governance indicators 
before and after the oil find, namely the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, Corruption Index and 
the Resource Governance Index. The following reasons motivate the focus on Ghana in this 
study: firstly, the IMF predicts that Ghana will be one of the fastest-growing economies in the 
world in 2019 and beyond, mainly due to the coming on stream of new oil and gas fields.  
Secondly, the country is relatively politically stable compared to other countries in the region. 
The findings indicate that emphasis is placed on the enactment of laws and policies and to 
some extent, evidence that these laws are implemented. The passage of laws does not 
guarantee good governance. Often, the missing link is how the laws are implemented. Since 
some of these laws have discretionary provisions, there are chances that indivual and 
institutional actors can exhibit altruistic behaviour otherwise. Global governance  indices 
therefore need to consider how these laws are implemented and their potential impact on the 
governed. 
This study assesses the governance framework that was in place before the oil and gas find 
in Ghana and those that have been put in place post-oil and gas. We then explore the 
performance of Ghana on key global governance indicators before and after the oil find, 
namely the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, Corruption Index and the Resource Governance 
Index. The following reasons motivate the focus on Ghana in this study: firstly, the IMF predicts 
that Ghana will be one of the fastest-growing economies in the world in 2019 mainly due to 
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the coming on stream of new oil and gas fields.  Secondly, the country is relatively politically 
stable compared to other countries in the region. The findings indicate that emphasis is placed 
on the enactment of laws and policies and to some extent, evidence that these laws are 
implemented. The reality is that, the passage of laws does not guarantee good governance. 
Often, the missing link is how the laws are implemented. Since some of these laws have 
discretionary provisions, these indices need to consider how the laws are implemented and 
their potential impact on the governed. 
























Countries that produce natural resources tend to experience lower growth and worse 
development outcomes compared to countries that do not – the so-called “natural resource 
curse” (Auty, 1993)[1].1 This phenomenon has been partially attributed to the absence of good 
governance (Mavrotas et al., 2011[2]; Graham et al., 2016 [3]). Good governance has been 
considered as a significant factor that can reverse the resource curse, thereby translating oil 
rents into sustainable development (Mehlum et al., 2006 [4]; Robinson et al. 2006[5]; Mavrotas 
et al., 2011[2]; Torvik, 2009 [6];  Amiri et al., 2019 [7]; Tsani, 2013 [8], Graham et al. 2016 [3]). 
For example,  Mehlum et al., (2006) [4] found that the differences in quality of institutions are 
the main reason why natural resources tend to be beneficial to some countries. Likewise, 
                                                          




































































Robinson et al. (2006) [5] showed that a resource boom would raise national incomes in the 
presence of robust institutions while it distorts the economy further in the presence of weak 
institutions.  
Oil and gas rents can constitute a significant budgetary instrument whose proper use is 
strongly dependent on government transparency and accountability. This money can foster 
long-term socio-economic development, but it can also be misused, for example, to extend 
the political and economic power of the ruling elite (Kowalezyk-Hoyer, 2011) [9]. 
In 2007, Ghana found crude oil in commercial quantities.  Since then, there have been several 
discoveries2 which are at various stages of development and production. The oil find was 
expected to have a positive effect on the economy and provide the necessary resources 
needed to pursue a sustainable development agenda ((Arthur, 2012 [10], Obeng-Odoom, 
2014 [11], Siakwah, 2018 [12]). Cautioned by the possibility of the new oil find being a curse 
instead of a blessing, Ghana put in place various measures aimed at improving governance 
in the petroleum sector and the broader economy such as the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act (PRMA). However, the critical policy-relevant questions remain: (1) has 
governance improved or deteriorated in Ghana since the onset of oil and gas production?; and 
(2) are there positive spillover effects from the improved governance in the petroleum sector 
to the broader economy?  
This study assesses the governance framework that was in place before the oil and gas find 
and those that have been put in place post-oil and gas. We then explore the performance of 
Ghana on key global governance indicators before and after the oil find. The following reasons 
motivate the focus on Ghana in this study; firstly, the IMF predicts that Ghana will be one of 
the fastest-growing economies in the world in 2019 mainly due to the coming on stream of 
new oil and gas fields.  Secondly, the country is considered to be relatively politically stable 
compared to other countries in the region. The country has undergone seven (7) successive 
elections from 1992 to 2016 which resulted in a peaceful transition of power between the two 
(2) main political parties. This has made the country one of the preferred investment 
destinations in Africa3. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 looks at the contribution of petroleum 
revenues to Ghana’s economy from 2011 to 2017.  In Section 3,  we discuss governance in 
the petroleum sector while Section 4 discusses the methodology used in this paper and key 
findings. In Section 5, we discuss the findings in the context of Ghana’s petroleum sector while 
the conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2 Oil and Gas and the Ghanaian Economy  
A total amount of 3,993.7 million USD was accrued from the exploitation of petroleum from 
2011 to 2017, as shown in Figure 1. The inflow of petroleum revenues have experienced a 
                                                          
2 See https://www.tullowoil.com/operations/west-africa/ghana/ten-field and 
https://www.eni.com/en_IT/operations/upstream/exploration-model/octp-ghana.page 






































































steady increase from 2011 to 2014  but started to decline in 2015. As expected, the pattern of 
receipts tends to mimic the movement in oil prices. 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from various PIAC Reports4 
**Where the line is average Brent crude oil price 
 
On average, petroleum revenues contributed 4.2% and 0.9% to domestic revenues and GDP, 
respectively.5 The highest contribution was in 2014. Not surprisingly, this is the year that the 
receipt of petroleum revenues was highest over the period under consideration. In terms of 
export, crude oil exports can be considered as the second-largest export commodity over the 
period under review after gold exports. On average the share of crude oil exports in total 
merchandise exports is 21.9% whiles that of cocoa is 21.2% although there is wide variability 
over time.  Crude oil was the second largest export commodity between 2012 and 2014. 
However, cocoa took over as the second largest commodity in 2015 and 2016. This 
corresponds to the period of decline in crude oil prices on the international market. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, crude oil had taken the second position in 2017. 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from various Bank of Ghana quarterly statistical bulletins6 
                                                          
4 http://www.piacghana.org/portal/5/25/piac-reports 























































































































Distribution of Petroleum Receipts 
Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (PRMA) as amended Act 893 makes 
provision for spending and savings of the petroleum revenues that accrue to the government. 
The PRMA prescribes two (2) main spending paths; allocations to Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation (GNPC) which is the National Oil Company (NOC) and funding to support the 
budget (Figure 3). The PRMA also makes provision for savings for stabilisation purposes and 
future generations. This section looks at how the revenues have been distributed for spending 
and saving purposes from 2011 to 2017. 
Figure 3: Petroleum Revenue Management Framework 
 
Source: PIAC (2018)  
In terms of spending by GNPC, the law requires that at most 55% of Ghana’s net equity and 
participating interest should be allocated to GNPC to cater for its financing needs. A total 
amount of 1,239.44 million dollars was allocated to GNPC over the period under consideration. 
This represents 31% of the total petroleum revenues that accrued to the government over the 
period. The highest allocation (left scale) was in 2012, which is about 43% of the petroleum 
receipts. In general, the allocation to GNPC has been declining since 2013 and only begun to 






































































Source: Authors’ construct from various PIAC Reports  
On the other hand, the law requires that at most 70% of benchmark revenue should be used 
to fund the budget, which is known as the Annual Budgeting Funding Amount (ABFA). A total 
amount of 1,696.6 million USD of petroleum receipts was used to support the budget (see 
Figure 5). This is approximately 62% of the total benchmark oil revenue received over the 
period. The highest allocation was done in 2014 when taken on year by year basis. As usual, 
the allocations to ABFA have been volatile over the years as can be seen in Figure 6, 
increasing since the onset of oil production but started to decline in 2015.  
As indicated earlier, the law mandates the government to save for stabilisation and for future 
generations. At least 30% of the benchmark revenue should be distributed to the Ghana 
Petroleum Funds (GPFs).  As can be seen from Figure 5, a total of 1100.26 million USD was 
distributed to the GPFs. This represents 39.9% of the benchmark oil revenue. The lowest 
allocations to the GPF was done in 2012 and 2015. However, the allocations to the GPF 
exceeded the minimum amount in 3 different years (2013, 2014 and 2017). This corresponds 
to the years that the allocations to the ABFA were lesser than the maximum amount. 
Out of the total amount allocated the GPFs, an amount of 776.54 million USD and 323.72 
million USD was distributed to the GSF and GHF respectively. This translates into 71% and 
29% respectively of the total amount allocated the GPFs. Furthermore, an exception of 2011, 
the distribution to the two (2) saving funds have been done following the law, that is, 30% and 
70% of GPF to the GHF and GSF respectively. 
The foregoing suggests that exploitation of petroleum have contributed largely to Ghana’s 
export and provided the Government with some fiscal space despite forming a small portion 
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3 Governance in the Petroleum Sector 
Altruistic and self-aggrandisement Behaviour in the Oil and Gas Sector:  Theory and Practice 
According to  [13]  a behavior is considered to be altruistic if it is motivated by a genuine desire 
to benefit another person,without any expectation of benefits to oneself.  [14] however 
posit that both the reciprosity (See [15]) and the kingship (see  [16])theories explain that 
altruistic beahviour can be conditional. In the case of the reciprosity theory, individuals 
and firms work hard to induce a sense of gratitude for past “favors”, whether real or 
imagined. In the context of Ghana, political appointments to the the Ministry of Energy 
are often guided by competence but also, the past contribution of the individual to the 
political part in power, the campaign of the presidential candidate and the region where 
the individual hails from. In the kingship theory, beneficiaries of an action  should be 
very close relatives, while reciprocity theory implies that beneficent behavior should be 
directed towards those with a high probability of reciprocating [14]. Over the last two 
decades, the concept of ‘family and friends’ governance has become more pronounced 
in Ghana’s governance systems. Often, the loopsholes and numerous discretionariy 
provisions are exploited to pursue these conditional altruistic behavior. The other form 
of behavior, which is the self-aggrandisement, manifests in corruption, rent seeking and 
other anti-development actions which enriches the individual a the expense of the state. 
The concept of good governance provides a plethora of long menu of institutional changes 
and capacity-building initiatives that are considered vital for development and shape 
individual and institutational behaviour  [17]. 
Good Governance in the Oil and Gas Industry:  Theory and Practice 
The concept of good governance provides a plethora of long menu of institutional changes 
and capacity-building initiatives that are considered vital for development (Grindle, 2007)[17]. 
These factors include strong institutions, competent human capital, accountability and 
transparency mechanisms, laws and policies and their implementation. According to Kofi 
Annan7, a former UN General Secretary, good governance is ensuring respect for human 
rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in 
public administration. The World Bank8, on the other hand, describes governance as the way 
power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources and 
identifies three main strands.  These are 
(i) the type of political regime;  
(ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's 
economic and social resources for development; and  
(iii)  the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and 
discharge functions." 
In the absence of good governance, McPherson and MacSearraigh (2007)[18] posit that 
several forms of corruption can exist. These include policy corruption, administrative 
corruption, commercial corruption, and diversification of massive amounts of money through 
the diversion of production, products, or revenues known as grand corruption. Indeed, the 
absence of good governance has been identified as a significant cause of the oil curse. 
According to Rahman (2016) [19], the concept of governance started replacing ‘government’ 
in the policy literature for two reasons. First, sovereign government’s control of service 
delivery, information and decisions were undermined by the flow of power away from 
traditional government institutions upwards to transnational bodies and downwards to regions 
and sub-regions the rise of global markets, the increasing importance of networks and social 
                                                          
7 See p 2. See http://www.soc.titech.acjp/uem/governance.html.  
8 World Bank(1994), Governance: The World Bank's Experience, Washington, DC: The 
World Bank, p xiv.  
 












































































partnerships, greater access to information, and growing social complexity are usually held 
accountable for this.  
Also, citizens started making demands for accountability that challenged the state’s monopoly 
to expertise (Newman, 2001) [20]. Singh (2003) [21] recounts that the concept of good 
governance first appeared in a World Bank’s report on Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis 
to Sustainable Growth, published in 1989. In the report, the World Bank described 
Africa’s problem as a crisis of governance.(Singh, 2003) [21]. Governance in Ghana’s 
Petroleum Sector. 
 
Indeed, Ghana has put in place several governance initiatives since the discovery of oil in 
2007 in commercial quantities.  Governance has become necessary, especially since oil 
resources are non-renewable. Some of these measures seek to either guard broadly all 
sectors of the economy or are specific to the extractive sector. This has improved governance 
issues in the extractive sector making citizens aware of the challenges and goodwill for Ghana. 
Some of these measures are highlighted below, categorised into laws and regulations, and 
other locally-adopted international conventions.  
UN Convention on Anticorruption: The UN Convention on Anticorruption came into force 
on the 14th  December 2005 to strengthen efforts to curb the rate of corruption across the 
world. Ghana signed onto the UN Convention against Corruption on December 9, 2004. 
Ghana is not just a signatory to this convention but rather a State Party. The Convention had 
three main purposes which include Promoting and strengthening measures aimed at 
preventing and combating corruption; Promote, facilitate and support international cooperation 
and technical assistance; and Promote integrity, accountability and proper management of 
public property. 
International Aid Transparency Initiative: This was an initiative launched in Accra, Ghana, 
at a high-level forum on Aid Effectiveness on 4th  September 2008. It was done for the 
enablement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals to be achieved. It was 
organized to know the gaps between the Non-Governmental Organizations (CSO) and the 
Ministries of state making sure that funds that are supposed to be used for development are 
not channelled into other projects which have not yet been considered. This initiative allows 
aid donors to publish their reports on aids whiles the government does the same to make sure 
funds allocated are not misused. The International Aid Transparency Initiative focuses on four 
major objectives namely: 
● Regular public disclosure of detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and 
when, available results of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, 
accounting, and audit by developing countries. 
● Support information systems for managing aid. 
● Access to full and timely information on annual commitments and disbursements of 
aids. 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): The Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) is a global standard that seeks to ensure openness, accountability and 
responsible financial management in the extractive industry (oil, gas and mining). EITI was 
instituted by Transparency international. Transparency international begun during the 1990s 
when there was little or no disclosure of information. Transparency international begun in May 
1993 as an anti-corruption initiative. In 1995, the Corruption Perception Index was developed. 
In 1999, Bribe payers’ index was developed to the country origin of multi-national companies 
and their susceptibility of offering bribes9   
In 2003, Ghana joined the EITI by making a public pronouncement to commit to the EITI 
standards. In 2007, Ghana became a candidate country by producing and publishing its first 








































































EITI report covering the period 2004-2006. The country finally assumed the status of a 
compliant country after completing the validation process in 2010. The country has since been 
implementing the standard to the mining sector and later extended to cover the petroleum 
sector. On the 24th of February, 2016, Ghana was honoured at the 2016 Global EITI 
Conference in Lima, Peru for turning recommendations in its EITI reports into reforms. 
Open Government Partnership: Ghana signed on to the OGP in September 2011. The OGP 
is a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to 
promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to 
strengthen governance. In the spirit of multi-stakeholder collaboration, OGP is overseen by a 
Steering Committee including representatives of governments and civil society 
organizations10. The four (4) thematic areas of OGP are Citizen Participation; Accountability 
and Technology and Innovation. The Public Sector Reform Secretariat (PSRS) under the 
Office of the President serves as the secretariat for OGP-Ghana. 
Inter-Government Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIAPA): 
GIABA is a body under the sub-regional body, Economic Commission of West African States 
(ECOWAS) of which Ghana is a member-state. It was formally founded on 9 December 1999. 
The purpose behind the formation of GIABA was to adopt and implement Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) within the sub-region. This is to 
be achieved through the following objectives which involve Protecting banking and financial 
systems of member countries against penetration by criminal proceeds; Harmonize and 
implement measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; Aid member states 
to implement the provisions of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other international 
conventions; Promote international cooperation; and Assessment of the effectiveness of 
existing AML and CFT measures. The Financial Intelligence Centre coordinates the activities 
of GIABA. 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy:  The National Anti-Corruption Strategy proposes an all-
inclusive approach to addressing the problem of corruption. These include Government, 
Citizens, Political Parties, Parliament, Anti-Corruption agencies, Electoral Commission, 
Regulatory and Oversight Bodies, and the Central Vigilance Commission. The Strategy aims 
at reducing petty corruption, grand corruption (demand and supply-side corruption), political 
corruption, administrative corruption and private sector participation in corruption. Aside the 
National Anti-Corruption Strategy, there is also the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan 
(NACAP, 2012-2021) which centres around four main areas, Building public capacity to 
condemn and fight corruption; Institutionalizing efficiency, accountability and transparency 
within public, private and not-for-profit sectors; Create a platform for individuals, media and 
civil society organisations to advance discussions on the reportage and combat of corruption 
in the country; and Proper investigation and prosecution of corrupt acts. The National Anti-
Corruption Strategy and NACAP both are interested in achieving all-inclusive participation in 
addressing the problematic concept of corruption. 
Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 821): This Act establishes the Petroleum 
Commission as the upstream regulator. The Act mandates the Petroleum Commission to 
regulate and manage the deployment of petroleum resources as well as to coordinate the 
policies in the upstream petroleum. Section 10(2) of the Act clearly extricates the Commission 
from the influence of the Minister of Energy and Petroleum. A seven-member board governs 
the Commission made up of a chairperson, the chief executive of the commission, the chief 
executive of the Ghana National Petroleum Company and four other persons one of whom 
should at least be a woman. 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815) as amended (Act 893): The 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act sets out the framework to regulate the allocation and 
management of revenues realised from Petroleum production in Ghana. Some sections of the 
Act were however amended in 2015 which was given presidential assent on 31 July 2015. 
The PRMA basically deals with what percentage of petroleum revenues should be allocated 
to the various funds such as the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation, and the Ghana Petroleum Funds (Heritage Fund and Stabilization 
                                                          




































































Fund). Aside from the allocation of revenues to these funds, the Act also stipulates what 
activities or projects these revenues going into these funds could be used to support or fund. 
Section 51 of the PRMA also establishes an independent oversight body known as the Public 
Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). PIAC is mandated to among others, monitor 
and evaluate compliance with the Act. 
Petroleum Exploration and Production (E&P) Law, 2016:  The E&P has been passed by 
parliament. The law replaces the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 1984. The law 
has provisions on reconnaissance licenses; improved fiscal terms; local content and 
management of the environment. Key transparency provisions also feature prominently in the 
law. This includes open and competitive bidding, open public tender process; public register 
of petroleum contracts. However, there is no provision on beneficial ownership disclosure. The 
current law also gives the Minister discretionary powers to set aside the outcome of an open 
and competitive process or even skip the tender process altogether.  
Since 2017, a petroleum register has been established. Also, an open and competitive bidding 
process for the award of petroleum licenses has been initiated. For the 2018/2019 licensing 
round, six (6) acreages will be awarded. Three (3) of the blocks will be awarded through an 
opening and competitive bidding process which is in line with section 10(3) of the Exploration 
and Production (E&P law and two (2) will be awarded through direct negotiations in line with 
section 10 (9) of the E&P Law. Finally, one (1) of the blocks will be given to GNPC for GNPC 
to look for strategic partners in line with section 7(9) of the E&P law.  
The foregoing suggests that Ghana’s effort in ensuring transparency and good governance 
has improved generally over the years.  We summarize in Table 1, the governance practices 
when oil production started in Ghana and 9 years after. 
4 Assessment  
To discuss the governance of the petroleum resources, we employ a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. We undertake a qualitative analysis of the performance of three (3) 
global governance indexes namely, the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index, Corruption Index, 
published by the Transparency International and the Resource Governance Index, published 
by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. Out of the many governance indicators 
available, the emphasis is given to indicators that relate much to oil and gas governance. On 
this basis, the Resource Governance Index, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and the 
Corruption Perception Index were selected. These indicators are themselves a host of other 
independently constructed indices developed by other entities. For these governance 
indicators, scores and trends are analysed to identify subtle governance issues. Attention is 
also given to major components of the index and their subcategories, especially those that are 
relevant to the oil and gas governance. 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is a product of Mo Ibrahim Foundation that 
measures governance in the 54 African countries.  First developed in 2007, the index currently 
consists of 191 variables from 35 sources that measure governance. The variables are 
combined to form 102 indicators, categorised into four governance dimensions – safety and 
the rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human 
development. Ghana’s governance performance as measured by the IIAG is reported in 
Figure 76  
From Figure 6, Ghana’s governance performance improved from 2008 to 2011, deteriorated 
from 2012 to 2015, improved in 2016 and further in 2017. In the past decade governance in 
Ghana improved by 0.9, from 67.2 in 2008 to 68.1 in 2017, witnessing many years of 
deterioration therein. Relating to oil production, governance improved in the years leading up 
to the era of oil production (2008 -2010) but deteriorated sharply after 2011 in the era  of oil 
production until 2016, which marked an unremarkable resurgence in good governance. 
A careful examination of the components of the index over the years, as found in the report 
indicate that though the country enjoys and has the right to take pride in its rule of law and 
national security provisions, transparency and accountability is the deterring factor to the 




































































shows, transparency and accountability correlate well with the overall governance in Ghana 
than any other indicator. Objects 3, for instance, shows the trend of transparency and 
accountability and the other poor performing sub-indicators in relation to the overall 
governance score. Transparency and Accountability are the weakest among these poor 
performing sub-categories of indicators under the four governance dimensions measured by 
IIAG.    
Transparency and Accountability is, therefore, a major factor negatively affecting governance 
in Ghana. Transparency was better in periods leading up to oil production (2008-2011) 
compared to the era of major oil production, which has seen transparency and accountability 
decline consistently. Transparency improved slightly in 2016 but hastened a fall in 2017.  
Figure 6: The Ibrahim African Governance Index and its four governance dimensions 
and some relevant indicators  
 
Source: Authors’ construct from  Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
 
Out of the four governance dimensions measured by IIAG, the leading contributor to the good 
governance in Ghana is participation and human right, followed by safety and rule of law (see 
box 2 in Figure 6). Governance relating to sustainable economic opportunity is the worst 
performer of all the four. Not surprisingly, this indicator play host to the poor performing sub-
categories of indicators exhibited in Object 3 in Figure 6, except for Transparency and 
Accountability. Of these, Public Management, Business Environment and Infrastructure spell 
doom for oil and gas production.   
From the 2017 IIAG report which ranked Ghana sixth in Africa, out of the other sub-indicators 
that are relevant to this study, access to justice and revenue mobilisation are increasingly 




































































sector and civil society participation are exhibiting warning signs. Finally, business regulatory 
environment, the effectiveness of the public service and access to public and legislative 
information are increasingly deteriorating. 
The Corruption Perception Index 
Corruption undermines countries and institutions; therefore, a globally accepted indicator of 
corruption is critical to the measure of good governance. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is 
a composite index like the IIAG and the foremost measure of corruption perception in the 
public sector across countries in the world published by Transparency International. CPI is 
available from 1995 to 2018.  
Until 2012 the scores were scaled from 0 to 10, highly corrupt to very clean (see Figure 7). In 
2012 however, Transparency International changed the methodology of the index, which 
allowed for year-on-year comparison of the score. The current CPI scores and ranks countries 
on a scale from 0 to 100, highly corrupt to very clean based on surveys of other independent 
institutions informed by the views of business folks and country experts. Thus, in this analysis, 
comparisons of the period before and after 2012 are done with caution.  The composite nature 
and breadth of the CPI make it more reliable than the individual surveys. The number of 
countries included has varied over the years. The 2018 CPI, the most recent CPI covered 180 
and utilized 13 surveys.11 For some countries, the number of surveys used was less than 13 
due to data unavailability.  
Ghana’ CPI score is not getting any better. The ratings rose from 45 in 2012 to 48 in 2014, 
declined thereafter to 40 in 2017 with little improvement to 41 in 2018, showing clearly that the 
country has not been consistent and lacks commitment in dealing with corruption. This is not 
a phenomenon pertaining only to oil the production era, but also for the period before oil 
production.  Before 2012, the CPI score, then on a scale of 0 to 10, averaged about 3.7 from 
2000 to 2011.  The year 2010, which marked the commencement of oil production in Ghana, 







Figure 7: CPI Performance of Ghana (2008 to 2018) 
                                                          
11 1.African Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2016 2.Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable 
Governance Indicators 2018 3.Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index 2017-2018 4.Economist Intelligence Unit 
Country Risk Service 2018 5.Freedom House Nations in Transit 2018 6.Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk 
Indicators 2017 7.IMD World Competitiveness Center World Competitiveness Yearbook Executive Opinion Survey 2018 
8.Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence 2018 9.The PRS Group International Country Risk Guide 
2018 10.World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 2017 11. World Economic Forum Executive Opinion 






































































Source : Authors’ construct from  Transparency International, 2019  
 
However, this could not be sustained in the following year as the score fell to 3.9 in 2011. 
Under the old scale, the lowest score (3.3) was recorded in 2003 and 2006. By means of 
scores alone, it is difficult to compare CPI throughout the eighteen years. Using the trend of 
CPI Rank, as presented in Figure 7, it is possible to make a good analysis. The change in 
methodology did not distort the pattern of Ghana’s CPI performance. The trend of CPI Rank 
after 2012 is similar to the pattern in the years past. This comparison is strengthened by the 
fact that since 2008 the number of countries covered by the index has risen to 180.  
Also, the country’s CPI Rank relates much to its CPI scores, the rank mostly improves and 
when the scores improve. It is therefore just to conclude that corruption perception in Ghana 
is worsening dramatically. Ghana’s performance was an all-time low (40) in 2017 ranking 81 
and could not improve much in 2018. Political will and commitment are needed to incorporate 
anti-corruption mechanisms in every public sector activity. There is the need to “prioritize 
better rules on lobbying and political financing, make public spending and contracting more 
transparent, and make public bodies more accountable” (Transparency International, 2012). 
In the oil and gas sector, an open and competitive bidding process has been initiated to issue 
exploration. In addition, a petroleum contract database12 has been established since 2018. 
Hopefully, these interventions can help reduce corruption perception in Ghana in the future. 
The Resource Governance Index 
Unlike the IIAG and CPI, the Resource Governance Index (RGI) is sector-specific and proves 
to be the most relevant among the three governance indexes. The RGI began with the 
publication of Revenue Watch Index published in 2010 by Revenue Watch in collaboration 
with Transparency International as a measure of transparency and accountability in the Oil, 
Gas and Mining Sectors. Revenue Watch published the second Resource Governance Index 
in 2013.  The third publication - the most recent index - is the 2017 RGI published by the 
Natural Resource Governance Institute, which came out of the merger of the Revenue Watch 
and the Natural Resource Chatter.  
The RGI scores and ranks countries relying on responses of experts in the extractive 
industries to a detailed questionnaire. From 2010 to 2017 the index has varied in terms of the 
components, the number of countries covered, and the kind of resource measured. In 2010 
and 2013, for Ghana, as shown in Figure 8, the index measured governance only in the mining 
sector. It did not cover governance in the oil and gas sector. The 2013 RGI involved 58 
countries. Ghana scored 63 and ranked 15th, a remarkable improvement from 35th position 
on the 2010 RWI which scored Ghana 32.3 for the mining sector. 
                                                          




































































Figure 8: Resource Governance Index for Mining and Oil and Gas Governance in Ghana 
 
Source: Authors’ construct from  Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2018 
The 2017 RGI index is made up of data from 2014 to 2017. Ghana had a satisfactory score of 
67 out of a maximum 100 points for the oil and gas governance which ranked 13th among 89 
countries. Ghana’s oil and gas governance performed far better than its mining governance 
which scored 56 and ranked 24th.   
 
Figure 9: Details of the 2017 RGI for Ghana  
 
Source: RGI 2017, Data and Source Document 
 
Ghana     performed relatively better in oil resource management than in the 
management of the mining sector. The aggregate score for oil was 67%. Ghana placed  
13th out of 89 countries. In the mining sector, Ghana scored 56% ,placing 24 out of 89 
countries.For this study, we concentrate on governance in the oil and gas sector in the rest 
of the analysis. Details of the 2017 RGI index for oil and gas governance in Ghana are reported 
in Figure 9. It assesses policies and practices governing the oil & gas industry in Ghana. 
According to the index, oil and gas governance in Ghana is the best resource governance in 
Sub Saharan Africa. 
But for revenue management, the main component of the governance index performed 
consistently well, with value realisation (licensing, taxation, state enterprises, and 
environmental protection) and enabling environment (concerning issues of accountability, rule 
of law, stability, corruption, regulatory, among others) scoring 61 and 70 respectively. The 
governance of revenue management performed poorly with a score of 37 out of 100. The 















































































36 out of 100. The value realisation measure also composed a measure on state-owned 
enterprises of which the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, the only state enterprise of 
the oil sector in Ghana scored 75. But for its non-commercial activities and the absence of 
rules of transparency around commodity sales, GNPCs governance score could have been 
better.  
The governance of Ghana’s stabilisation fund scored 93 and ranked 2nd among sovereign 
wealth funds in resource-rich countries. However, the index reveals the need to disclose the 
asset in which the fund can invest and provide justification for the cap on the stabilisation fund, 
which has unfortunately been lowered over the years. 
4.4 World Governance Indicators 
Kaufmann et al. (2005) [23] identify the indicators of good governance as voice and 
accountability, political stability, government efficiency, regulatory quality, the rule of law and 
control of corruption. 




Source: Authors’ construct from World Bank’s Governance Indicators, 2019 
According to Figure 10, while Voice and Accountability, and Rule of Law has improved 
between 2010 and 2018, Government Effectiveness, Control of Corruption and Regulatory 
Quality has declined. Political Stability is at the same level as 2010. 
From a political perspective, Torvik (2002) [23] argues that oil discovery and production 
generate incentives for rent-seeking behaviour among policymakers. According to Lane and 
Tornell (1996) [24], the oil curse is also caused by the ‘voracity effect’ in which oil revenue is 
wasted through corruption, weak governance and excessive rent-seeking among competing 
interest groups. Corruption, which is a key consequence of rent-seeking behaviour, has been 
proven to be an anti-growth factor (Bardhan, 1997) [25]. One of the determinants of rent-
seeking is governmental confusion between wealth creation and wealth extraction (Gylfason, 
2001) [26]. Economic rent is the excess of revenue derived from a certain activity over the 
sum of its supply prices of capital, labour and any other related inputs required to undertake 
the activity (Garnaut and Ross, 1983) [27]. Similarly, resource rent is the value-added of the 
                                                          
13 See https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 

















2018 0.58 0.03 -0.21 -0.08 0.07 -0.11
2010 0.51 0.03 -0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.01




































































natural resource, the difference between the revenues generated from the extraction of the 
resource and the extraction cost and the cost of factors of production and their opportunity 
cost  (Dickson, 1999) [28].  
This definition is affirmed by Watkins (2001) [29] who posits that economic rent is the value of 
the resource at the point of production less all prior costs incurred, including expected return 
on investment. These costs include wages, interest on capital, the profits of entrepreneurs and 
the reward for land. Although these present a high opportunity for job creation, Torvik (2002) 
[23] finds that oil production leads to rent-seeking entrepreneurship.  
In Ghana’s case, the emphasis has been placed on the passage of laws and the formulation 
of governance policies. In addition, several governance-related protocols have been signed 
onto. We argue that this approach has three limitations. First, the enactment of these laws and 
policies do not guarantee implementation. For instance, while section 48 of the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act mandates the Minister for Finance to publish the status of oil-
funded projects annually; this provision was not implemented until 201714 though the law was 
passed in 2011.  
Second, although the country has its specific economic, cultural and political circumstances, 
the laws are sometimes adopted wholesale from Norway or other countries considered to have 
best practices. An example is the investment of the petroleum funds outside the country which 
earns a negative interest rate in some instance while the country borrows at higher interest 
rate differentials. Even though this satisfies the concept of intergenerational equity, efforts to 
debate alternative ways to invest the petroleum funds have proven futile, since the status quo 
satisfies the ‘Norway Model’.  
Finally, the laws grant discretionary powers to the Ministers of Finance and Energy without 
any regulations or guidelines on how such discretion should be exercised. Though open and 
competitive bidding process for the award of petroleum licenses, the Minister for Energy 
earmarked three out of six blocks for non-competitive process in Ghana’s first licensing 
rounds15. Such unregulated discretion can be a source of rent-seeking. 
 
5 Discussion 
As diagnosed by the analysis above, one major challenge to good governance in Ghana is 
transparency and accountability, according to IIAG, which could provide the breeding ground 
for corruption as pointed out by the CPI. Measures of governance regarding sustainable 
economic opportunity makes the situation worse, as governance indicators such as public 
management, business environment, and infrastructure are poor. They revealed challenges 
in budgetary and financial management, corruption in the public sector, insufficient civil society 
participation, deteriorating business regulatory environment, ineffective public service and 
increased restriction in accessing public & legislative information.  
In the absence of sustainable economic opportunity, corruption ripe, peace and stability are 
threatened. Those are the general outlook of governance in the country as indicated by the 
IIAG and CPI.  They, however, cast a shadow on the oil and gas resource governance in the 
country. Lessons of the natural resource curse surrounding mineral exploitation in Ghana 
prompted measures to engender good governance in the wake of the oil find in Ghana. For 
this reason, and learning from global trends, several laws have been passed for the production 
of oil and gas and the efficient management of its revenues. These have promoted good 
governance in the oil and gas sector than there is in the mining sector, even to the extent that 
oil and gas governance in Ghana ranks first in Sub Saharan Africa.  
That notwithstanding, the 2017 RGI makes known that the standards of practice of these laws 
are well below their enactments, scoring the legal framework 70 and the implementation or 
practice, 63. This suggests a challenge with the implementation of legal frameworks of oil and 
                                                          
14 See https://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/business/economy/201805/351947.php 




































































gas in Ghana, and that the many laws as outlined in the section of this paper are in themselves 
not the end but a means to good governance.  
Furthermore, in line with the worry of over budgeting and financial management issues 
indicated by IIAG, the RGI singled out national budgeting as a major challenge to the oil and 
gas sector, scoring it 36, well below the average of all resource governance indicators 
assessed. The governance of national budgeting is weak because of the challenge of linking 
petroleum revenues to general public financial management rules that could discourage acts 
like borrowing against projected revenues, overestimating revenues and changing rules 
(NRGI, 2017) [30].  This reflects in the volatile nature of allocation to the ABFA, even to the 
extent of exceeding the 70% benchmark in 2012, with the effect of starving the stabilisation 
and heritage funds. There is a call for transparency as regards asset selection and the use of 
funds for any purpose such as the Free Senior High School (Free SHS) program. Free SHS 
program may provide intergenerational equity as defined byy Beckner (2009), [31] offering 
benefits between the present and future generations. It may also be a source of human capital 
development to generate sustainable development. However, the volatile, large and 
exhaustible nature of oil revenues requires that Free SHS is situated within a proper national 
development plan with the necessary transparency and accountability provisions. More so, 
planning regarding the use of oil revenue for any purpose is required since the economy is 
already exhibiting heavy reliance on the resource for development financing and economic 
growth. 
Moreover, analysis of the 2017 RGI revealed a problem with the non-commercial activities of 
GNPC (see Table 1). This comes in addition to GNPC’s transparency problems on rules 
regarding commodity sales. The national oil company sponsors non-commercial activities 
such as sports and entertainment, lends to the government, without any publicly known social 
investment strategy. In a recent report by ACEP16 analysing the work program of GNPC, 
ACEP (2019) [32] revealed the intention of the Corporation to spend $43.05 million of its 
revenue on Corporate Social Responsibility in the 2019 financial year. Alarming as the 
situation is, this amount represents about 254% of the total Budget of the entire Ministry of 
Energy.  
Issues regarding the publication of audited reports are also worrying. These practices create 
room for the perception of corruption and corrupt practices to thrive.  GNPC, a corporation that 
receives 55% or less of the country’s carried and participating interest, and received 31% of 
the total petroleum revenues that accrued to the government over the period 2011 - 2017, 
must be circumspect, transparent and accountable in all its activities.  
Finally, examining of IIAG, it came to light that transparency in the years preceding oil 
production was better than the level of transparency in the era of oil production. This can be 
attributed to rent-seeking behaviour which thrives in secrecy as some public officials do their 
best to frustrate measures of transparency and accountability. 
 
 






































































Table 1. Governance practices in the oil and gas sector – comparing 2011 and 2019 
Variable  2011 2019 Comments 
Oil Resource 
Ownership 
The Constitution grants ownership of 
natural resources, including petroleum to 
the state 
Both the constitution and the Petroleum and 
Exploration Law  
Session 3 of the  Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Law (2016) stipulates that 
"Petroleum existing in its natural state in, under 
or upon any land Ghana, rivers, streams, 
watercourses throughout Ghana, the exclusive 
economic zone and any area covered by the 
territorial sea or continental shelf, is the 
property of the Republic of Ghana and is 
vested in the President on behalf of and in 
trust for the people of Ghana" 
In addition to the 1992 Constitution, the 
Exploration and Production Law places 
the ownership of the petroleum 
resources in the state. Session 3 of the  
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) 
Law (2016) stipulates that "Petroleum 
existing in its natural state in, under or 
upon any land Ghana, rivers, streams, 
watercourses throughout Ghana, the 
exclusive economic zone and any area 
covered by the territorial sea or 
continental shelf, is the property of the 
Republic of Ghana and is vested in the 
President on behalf of and in trust for 
the people of Ghana" 
Licensing Process Direct negotiations had become a default 
system through which contracts were 
awarded. 
Session 10 (3) of the Petroleum Exploration 
and Production Act (2016) states that a 
Petroleum agreement shall only be entered 
into after an open, transparent and competitive 
public tender process. However, sub-section 
(9) states: "Despite subsection (3) the Minister 
may, in consultation with the commission, that 
a petroleum agreement may be entered into by 
direct negotiations where direct negotiations 
represent the most efficient manner to achieve 
optimal exploration and production of 
petroleum resources in a given area" 
In 2018, the government launched a 
licensing round for 6 blocks. For the first 
time, 3 of the blocks will be awarded 
through an open and competitive 
bidding process. However, 2 of the 
blocks will be awarded through direct 
negotiations whilst 1 will be reserved for 
the national oil company17. Whilst 
information on the three blocks 
earmarked for competitive bidding has 
been made available in accordance with 
the Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Law and expectation of Civil 
Society, there are still concerns on how 
the strategic partner of GNPC would be 
                                                           




































































selected and how the direct negotiations 
would be conducted. 
Contract Disclosure The government signed three contracts in 
2015 according to Newspaper reports. 
These are  
i. The Ghana Government/GNPC and 
ENI and Vitol contract for the Offshore 
Cape Three Point integrated oil and 
gas project  
ii. A  joint venture between Government, 
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, 
Swiss African Oil Company Limited and 
PET Volta Investments for Exploration 
in the Keta Delta Block.  
iii. Petroleum Agreement by and among 
the Government of the Republic of 
Ghana, Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation, GNPC Exploration, and 
Production Company Limited and 
Springfield Exploration and Production 
Limited in respect of the Conduct of 
Exploration and Production Operations 
in the West Cape Three Points Block 2 
Offshore Ghana. A search on the 
Website of the Ministry of Petroleum18, 
the Ghana Petroleum Commission and 
the contract database of the Africa 
Centre for Energy Policy19, Open Oil 
website20, and GNPC's open data 
portal21, indicate that the government 
has not disclosed any signed contracts 
A petroleum register has been established22.   
                                                           
18 http://www.petromin.gov.gh/downloads.html  
19 http://www.acepghana.com/contract-database/  
20 http://repository.openoil.net/wiki/Ghana  
21 http://www.gnpcghana.com/open_data.html  




































































in 2015 but were ratified by parliament 
on 11 March 2016 (Order Paper, 
Resolution 10, (2)). Before 2015, the 
government's disclosure of contracts 
was due to public pressure to do so 
and also as a result of TULLOW PLC 
having made its contract with the 
government public. The government 
has not shown any commitment to 
disclose contracts in the hydrocarbon 
sector. Even though the Minister of 
Petroleum had issued a moratorium on 
oil contracts in 2014, the Ministry went 
ahead to develop contracts, which were 
ratified Parliament in March 2016.  
None of these contracts has been 
made public. Tullow's Ghana 
agreements are now up on Tullow's 




Though Section 28 of Legislative 
Instrument 1652 stipulates that the Agency 
(Environmental Protection Agency) shall 
cause to be published in the Gazette 
notification of any codes of practice, 
standards, and guidelines in connection a. 
with matters provided for under these 
Regulations for the purpose of giving 
guidance; and b. with matters relating to the 
protection, development and rehabilitation 
of the environment. Therefore, the 
environmental mitigation/management plan, 
which is provided under this Regulation 
should be published in the Gazette, only the 
Environmental mitigation plan of Sankofa 
has been public while the environmental 
management plan of Tullow was published. 
An Oil and Gas Unit has been established 





































































environmental practices of oil companies in 
line with the law. 
Management of the 
National Oil 
Company 
GNPC board comprises of seven members. 
All these people do not hold a position in 
the current government. However, Abraham 
Amaliba contested the primaries of the 
National Democratic Congress, the ruling 
party. In addition, only one audited was 
published as of 2016. Since 2017, the 
chairman of the national oil company is also 
the chairman of the ruling party. 
The current chairman of the board of directors 
is also the chairman of the ruling party. Other 
audited accounts have been published.  
There has not been much change with 
regards to corporate governance. 
Most of the Board members (four out of 
seven) of the National Oil Company are 
politically exposed persons. This implies 
that their independence from the political 




Requirements such as the publication of 
revenues received, and allocations to 
different funds were done. Though the law 
required publication of oil-funded projects, 
this was not done. Indeed, in 2015, civil 
society threatened to sue the Ministry of 
Finance to publish the list23.  
In keeping up with Section 48 of the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) as 
Amended Act (893), the Minister of Finance 
also submitted the 2015 Annual Report on the 
receipts utiliSation of the Petroleum Funds for 
2015 fiscal year to Parliament as part of the 
budget statement. The total petroleum receipt 
for 2015 was also disclosed in the 2015 
reconciliation report on the Petroleum Holding 
Fund 
There has been an improvement in 
terms of petroleum revenue 
management. There are still concerns 
on the scanty nature of oil-funded 
projects, the thinly spread, the arbitrary 
capping of the stabilisation fund and no 
public input into the selection of priority 
areas. Factors such as the passage of 
the fiscal responsibility law, the practice 
of the law such as the constitution of the 
Fiscal Council and the alignment of the 
2019 mid-year budget deficit to the law 
and the data portals established at the 
Petroleum Commission including the 
Ghana petroleum register have 
contributed to enhanced transparency in 
oil resource management. 
Source: Authors’ compilation, 2019 





































































6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The Petroleum Revenue Management Law has embedded in its good governance provisions 
on accountability and transparency. One of the unique features of the law is the active 
participation of an oversight body made up of nominated members of diverse non-
governmental groups known as the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC). The 
law also mandates other institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana 
to provide a detailed report within a specified period. Quite frankly, a lot of information has 
been made available on the receipts and utilisation of petroleum revenues. However, the 
implementation of the law over the past seven (7) have proven that the law is not without 
defects.  Key among the limitations are timeliness of information, discrepancies in information 
made available to the public by various agencies, lack of detailed information on ABFA funded 
projects and spending choices by the national oil company. These weaknesses provide 
opportunities for altruistic and self-aggrandising behaviour. 
To discuss the governance of the petroleum resources within a broader context, Ghana’s 
performance on three global governance indexes was assessed. Namely, the Mo Ibrahim 
Governance Index, Corruption Index, published by the Transparency International and the 
Resource Governance Index, published by the Natural Resource Governance Institute. Out of 
the many governance indicators available, the emphasis is given to indicators that relate much 
to oil and gas governance.  
On this basis, the Resource Governance Index, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and 
the Corruption Perception Index were selected. These indicators are themselves a host of 
other independently constructed indices developed by other entities. For these governance 
indicators, scores and trends are analysed to identify subtle governance issues. Attention is 
also given to major components of the index and their subcategories, especially those that are 
relevant to the oil and gas governance. 
According to the findings, Ghana’s performance on the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index 
deteriorated between 2012 and 2015 mainly due to transparency and accountability issues. 
The index started to improve from 2016, but transparency and accountability continued to 
decline. Transparency and Accountability are the weakest among these poor performing sub-
categories of indicators under the four governance dimensions measured by IIAG.   
Transparency and Accountability is, therefore, a major factor behind the deteriorating 
governance in Ghana. Transparency was better in periods leading up to oil production (2008-
2011) compared to the era of significant oil production, which has seen transparency and 
accountability decline consistently. The year 2010, which marked the commencement of oil 
production in Ghana, recorded the highest CPI score ever under this old scale with a score of 
4.1. However, this could not be sustained in the following year as the score fell to 3.9 in 2011. 
Under the old scale, the lowest score (3.3) was recorded in 2003 and 2006. 
According to the Resource Governance Index, oil and gas governance in Ghana is the best 
resource governance in Sub Saharan Africa. However, when compared with global leaders 
like Norway, Ghana has a long way to go. But for revenue management, the main component 
of the governance index performed consistently well, with value realization (licensing, taxation, 
state enterprises, and environmental protection) and enabling environment (concerning issues 
of accountability, rule of law, stability, corruption, regulatory, among others.) scoring 61 and 
70 respectively. The governance of revenue management performed poorly with a score of 
37 out of 100.  Again, there were issues with the inadequate information on the reasons for 
capping the stabilization fund at a specified level. 
Are altruistic and self-seeking behaviour evident in Ghana’s oil and gas sectorgood 
governance and the petroleum sector awkward couple or Siamese twins? Evidence suggests 
that good governance practices are required to promote sustainable petroleum resource 
management. This implies that institutions need to be established, human capital developed, 
laws and regulations passed whilst transparency and accountability measures put in place. 
However, the presence of these systems and initiatives only partially guarantee good 
governance. The implementation, review and continual improvement in governance systems 




































































have been passed, regulatory and other relevant institutions have been established, 
scholarships have been awarded to build capacity while the Public Interest and Accountability 
Committee has been established to promote good governance. These notwithstanding, 
implementation of these laws have not been smooth. The inclusion of discretionary provisions, 
the absence of guidelines to exercise these discretionary provisions and parliament’s 
unwillingness to act on PIAC’s recommendations mean there is a general improvement in 
transparency but limited accountability. These had led to a number of cases where the laws 
that were passed, had not or partialy been followed. It has led to a situation where 
transparency has improved but accountability appears to be stagnant. 
In a nutshell, three key observations are made. First, the passage of laws and evidence of 
implementation, which are often measured by these indices measure, may not suitably tell the 
story of good governance. For instance, whilst a score will be awarded for the establishment 
of a regulator like the Petroleum Commission, effort should be made to analyse the extent to 
which the Commission has performed its core mandate. Therefore, how the laws are 
implemented should be of much interest. Second, the exercise of discretionary power by 
Ministers should be of much concern since its an avenue for conditional altruistic behaviour or 
self seeking interventions. Finally, the indices should also have a bottom-up assessment to 
ensure balance. For instance, how the implementation of laws and policies are affecting the 
livelihood of the individuals and entities who are governed. 
The study recommends that the government should implement holistically and immediately 
the governance provisions in the Petroleum Revenue Management Law. Also, though certain 
types of public disclosures may not be required by law, publishing such information can 
enhance public confidence in the petroleum governance system.0 
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